

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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The Stalin Era and Stalin's Heirs

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE indictment of Josef Stalin personally and of his regime, pronounced by his successor as Soviet Communist Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, is one of the most spectacular documents in history. It ends once for all a historical argument that might otherwise have gone on indefinitely. Stalin is now branded by one of his intimate henchmen as a paranoid tyrant with a mania for suspecting imaginary plots, a sadist who personally authorized and approved the use of torture to extract false confessions, and a fraudulent pretender as regards military genius and profound knowledge of economics. In short, one of the most unpleasant historical figures since Genghiz Khan and Ivan the Terrible.

Khrushchev's denunciation has, figuratively at least, reduced to pulp an extensive literature, not only in Russia but abroad, devoted to praise and glorification of the deceased dictator, glossing over or denying his monstrous crimes. How silly a certain American ex-Ambassador must feel now as he recalls that he described this mass murderer as a man so gentle that a dog would sidle up to him and a child would sit in his lap. What price Sidney and Beatrice Webb's ecstatic and ponderous description of the Soviet Union under the terrorist rule of this half insane despot as a new and superior civilization? Or the rhapsodies of Anna Louise Strong, or Owen Lattimore's laudatory account of the Kolyma slave labor center without mentioning that any one was there against his will, or the persistent effort to look on the bright side of Soviet conditions by Vera Micheles Dean and Frederick L. Schuman?

All this is now gone with the wind and it is clear that writers who were disparagingly branded as anti-Communist were merely telling the objective truth. Is there, for instance, in Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* anything more ghastly than Khrushchev's account of how Stalin prepared the frame-up of the doctors whom he accused of a fantastic plot to poison leading Red Army generals:

"Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly: 'If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head.'

"Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him in-

structions, advised him on which investigative methods should be used; these methods were simple: beat, beat, and once again, beat."

Khrushchev's indictment, although certainly ample to discredit the shamefully extensive literature of pro-Soviet apologetics, is partial and selective. Several of Stalin's greatest crimes, from the standpoint of intrinsic cruelty and the numbers of human beings affected, are not even mentioned. Among these are the starving to death of millions of peasants in 1932-1933 in order to force acceptance of collective farming; the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class"; the institution of a huge network of slave labor camps; the deportation of about 1.2 million people from Eastern Poland and several hundred thousand from the Baltic States under conditions so barbarous that great numbers of them perished; the massacre of some fifteen thousand Polish officer war prisoners in the Katyn Forest and elsewhere in 1940.

Indeed the impression conveyed by some passages in Khrushchev's speech is that terrorism is an entirely legitimate instrument of political struggle, if it is limited to certain groups and classes. What probably stirred and shocked the delegates at the Twentieth Party Congress more than any of Khrushchev's other revelations were these grim statistics about what Stalin did to the leading circles of the Communist Party during the thirties:

"Of the 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress (in 1934) 98 persons, 70%, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938). . . .

"The same fate met not only the Central Committee members, but also the majority of the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress. Of 1,966 delegates with voting or consultative rights 1,108 persons were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes, *i.e.* decidedly more than a majority."

This sort of thing was coming too close to home to be acceptable to the delegates of the Twentieth Party Congress, the audience for Khrushchev's speech. Some questions which even the members of this audience must have asked themselves have been put in statements by representatives of foreign Communist Parties. Their leaders have been placed in a difficult and somewhat humiliating position. After having served for decades as a volunteer propaganda agency for the Soviet Union, after having trumpeted the glories of Stalin to all who would listen to them these Communists outside the Soviet Union find all this propaganda suddenly repudiated by Moscow.

In an effort to relieve their dilemma and also in order to answer the unspoken questions of many Soviet citizens, the heirs of Stalin published in *Pravda* a communication from the Secretary of the American Communist Party, Eugene Dennis, and then issued a long reply to mildly critical questions which had been addressed to them not only by Dennis, but by various European Communist leaders, notably Palmiero Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party, largest in Europe outside the iron curtain.

These questions could be summarized in one: "What were you, leaders of the Communist Party, members of the Politburo, doing while this savage reign of terror was going on?"

The official answer of the present Communist Party Central Committee is of a rather lame, defensive character and shows some traces of a feeling that perhaps the denigration of Stalin has been pushed a little too fast. Among the excuses offered were the perilous international situation, "demanding iron discipline, ever growing vigilance and a most strict centralization of leadership"; Stalin's popularity with the masses, due to the association of his name with "the success of socialist construction" and the fact that many of Stalin's misdeeds only came to light after his death and "the exposure of the Beria gang."

Togliatti's suggestion that there had been degeneration in Soviet society is indignantly rejected; Stalin's mistakes did not divert Soviet society from the correct road to Communism.

In view of the shock and dismay which the rough demolition of the Stalin legend must have caused to many Communists in the Soviet Union, especially those of the younger generation, brought up on the myth of Stalin the beneficent and all-wise, in view of the embarrassment caused to foreign Communists and to the Communist cause generally by the admission that the Stalin era was quite as nightmarish as its foreign critics had represented, the question arises: Why the drive against the memory of the dead dictator? It would have seemed quite feasible for Stalin's heirs to let his memory fade away gradually. And for three years after Stalin's death this was the course that seemed to have been chosen. Stalin was still honored, but less and less conspicuously. No public word of outright denunciation of the dead dictator was uttered until the Communist Party Congress in February. Even then the public criticisms voiced by Anastas Mikoyan were comparatively moderate; Khrushchev's far more spectacular and vehement indictment had not,

up to the time of writing (July 5) been released for general circulation in the Soviet Union.

There is some reason to believe that the question of how to deal with Stalin's memory is an issue in higher Soviet Communist political struggles, which are no less intense because they take place behind closed doors and curtained windows. A careful study of Soviet official comment on the subject reveals a vacillation between more extreme and more qualified condemnations of Stalin, apparently reflecting the conflicting views of two or more factions among the new Soviet rulers.

This aspect of the situation may become clearer as a result of the future course of Soviet political development. It is very doubtful whether the present balance of power between Soviet leaders, with Khrushchev the more articulate and active partner in the Khrushchev-Bulganin duumvirate, will last indefinitely. There have been two big political shake-ups in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin, the arrest and subsequent execution of secret police chief Lavrenti Beria and the bloodless deposition of former Premier Georgi Malenkov. Molotov, third member of the triumvirate which first took over the succession to Stalin (Malenkov-Beria-Molotov) has been ousted from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It will be surprising if there are not other shake-ups in the future, because there is no standard of legitimacy in a totalitarian dictatorship, no agreed constitutional method of determining peacefully the distribution of power among the men at the top. Until there is a single recognized boss with the formidable authority of Stalin, factions, subterranean intrigues and maneuvers are almost unavoidable.

If there are disadvantages in the degradation of Stalin, there are also political advantages to be hoped for, at home and abroad, and it is in these advantages that one must seek the explanation for the anti-Stalin course. First, Stalin's supposed popularity was as synthetic as the virtues and achievements set down by his eulogists. The whole country lived under a heavy pall of fear and terror, overworked, underfed, in drab physical conditions.

While the masses of the people count for little under totalitarian rule, there are three influential groups which might be expected to welcome the deflation of the Stalin myth. One of these is the managerial bureaucracy, the class that runs the Soviet state politically and economically. This class obtained preferential material conditions under Stalin, who made a clean sweep of early Communist

dreams of equal living standards. But it possessed no sense of security. The man who was directing a big factory one day might find himself in a slave labor camp the next, depending on the dictator's capricious whims. What this group desires above everything is more legality, more stability.

Then there is the Red Army leadership, which feels about Stalin's alleged military genius much as the old professional German generals felt about Hitler's. Outstanding war leaders like Marshal Georgi Zhukov were degraded and demoted by the suspicious Stalin after the end of hostilities. Thousands of Army officers, including many Marshals like Tukhachevsky were victims of Stalin's ferocious purges. Here is another influential group that would welcome the toppling of the Stalin image from its pedestal. Finally, there are the students and the Soviet intelligentsia generally who must have blushed for some of the silly chauvinism cultivated after the war by Stalin (with Russians represented as the "first" inventors of almost everything under the sun), who chafe under enforced isolation from cultural contacts with the West.

In Anatole France's vivid novel of the French Revolution (which is also very applicable to the spirit and conditions of the Russian Revolution), *The Gods Are Athirst*, the last scenes take place after the fall of Robespierre and the Jacobin extremists on the so-called Ninth Thermidor. The busts of Marat, moving spirit in acts of mob violence and terrorism, are thrown down amid execration and reviling by the newly enriched class which wants order, stability, and a chance to enjoy life. Consciously or unconsciously Khrushchev and his associates in the anti-Stalin drive are playing up to a Thermidorian psychology in the Soviet Union.

Abroad, also, there are possible advantages to be grasped, despite the acute embarrassment caused to the leaders of Communist parties in the satellite countries and in the West. One of the most obvious of these is the healing of the rift with Tito, the bringing back of this seceding Communist into a relationship of friendly neutrality. Any signs of moderation in the Soviet Union are also likely to pay political dividends in India, Burma, and other Asian neutralist countries. And there are always socialists who are hankering in their hearts after a united front with Communists.

In the present state of international relations a spread of neutralism, a weakening in the cohesion of NATO and other defensive alliances against Communism is worth more to Stalin's heirs than an upsurge of militant Communist revolutionism, which would be

very hard to bring about in a Europe that has regained and, in some areas, surpassed its pre-war standards of wellbeing. The Soviet rulers can well afford to freeze the territorial status quo so long as they can maintain their grip on their satellite empire, including the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Indeed the new "Stalin made great mistakes" line perhaps promises most in foreign policy. Stalin, by such measures as the launching of the Korean war, the blockade of Berlin, the excommunication of Tito, the imposition of a cultural iron curtain, had run Soviet foreign policy into an impasse. His successors are trying to extricate themselves, to work out a more flexible policy, one better suited to a period when the threat of large-scale war has somewhat receded because of the terrific mutual destruction threat presented by nuclear weapons.

While the Soviet "new look" has caused some confusion and disagreement in the Western camp, it is also causing obvious problems for the men who are trying to put it into effect. As a retreat is a difficult operation in war, a partial relaxation of control is a difficult maneuver for an absolute dictatorship.

The first period of uncertainty after the death of Stalin was marked by two unprecedented events: the revolt in the Soviet Zone of Germany in June, 1953, and the still more amazing rebellion in the Vorkuta slave labor camp. After Stalin's second death, the destruction of his legend, came the Poznan outbreak and more or less authenticated rumors of unrest in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

It is not easy to introduce convincing and satisfying reforms while maintaining the essential structure of dictatorship. It may be possible to soften terror, to get along without the mass purges which were a feature of Stalin's time. But the only real guarantees against arbitrariness are to be found in measures which go far beyond anything Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Soviet Union and their satellite satraps in Eastern Europe would be willing to concede: freedom of speech, press and election, independent courts, an end of the one-party system.

To arouse the hope of liberty without satisfying it may create more ferment and unrest than Stalin's methods of iron rule and permanent terrorism, when the hope of the individual was only to survive. In the same way the establishment of wider contacts between the Soviet Union and the satellite states and the West may have its dangers. In granting to some extent the desire of educated Soviet citizens for freer contact and travel it may prove

difficult to exclude the contamination of Western ideas of individual liberty and a life not regimented so severely by the state.

In this connection one may recall an eloquent passage in Klyuchevsky's great history of Russia, describing the dilemma of Peter the Great, who wanted to give Russia the material advantages of Western industry, commerce, technical advantages, and administrative institutions, but without abating one iota of his absolute power or changing the serf basis of the Russian state of that time.

"He (Peter)," writes Klyuchevsky, "hoped through the threat of his authority to evoke initiative in an enslaved society, and through a slave-owning nobility to introduce into Russia European science and popular education as the necessary condition of social initiative. He desired that the slave, remaining a slave, should act consciously and freely. The inter-action of despotism and freedom, of education and slavery—this is the political squaring of the circle, the riddle which we have been solving for two centuries from the time of Peter, and which is still unsolved."¹

The riddle remains unsolved and there is no proof that the current attempt to soften a dictatorship without granting genuine liberty will provide a solution.

There are still many old aspects of the Soviet new look. The men who now probably somewhat uneasily share power in the Soviet Union are Stalin's henchmen who, while he was alive, vied with each other in sycophantic tributes to him. Stalin's basic policies of imperialism abroad and maximum pressure on the living standard of the people in the interest of building a huge military establishment and grandiose industrial projects have not been changed. Unlike the Party Congresses in the first years of the Soviet regime, when there were sharp debates and divisions in voting, the Twentieth Party Congress was as unanimous in its resolutions as any congress called under Stalin.

Khrushchev, Bulganin, and other Soviet leaders profess to desire more extensive contacts with the West. But the "Potemkin village" technique is still employed for foreign visitors. This is evident from the following excerpt from an article contributed by Pierre Lochak, member of a French Socialist delegation which visited Moscow in the spring of 1956, published in *The New Leader* of July 9:

"The meetings and conversation actually took place in the factory director's office with him and his staff. In the shops every delegate

¹V. Klyuchevsky, *Kurs Russkoi Istorii*, Vol. IV, p. 282.

was flanked by guides whose presence clearly did not contribute to putting at ease the workers with whom we tried to strike up conversation. As for lunch, it took place in the workers' restaurant, but at an hour when the workers were no longer there, and the menu was of the generous proportions always offered to visitors in the U.S.S.R. (smoked salmon, chicken, etc.), but very different from the workers' menu which we saw posted.

"Wherever we went, a sort of 'directors' curtain' was raised: dinner at a students' club without students, a visit to a state farm without farmers, and so on. How could one know what the Soviet citizen thinks and says when the directors and managers are not around?"

A good deal of reserve and caution in appraising and responding to the Soviet new look seems appropriate for Western statesmen. For no one can say with certainty, in view of vacillations in the anti-Stalin campaign and numerous zigzags of Soviet and international Communist policy in the past, how lasting it would be or how deeply it will penetrate. At present it would seem that, although Stalin's ghost, with ironical justice, is being cast for the scapegoat role which Stalin himself prepared for so many of his victims, a good many features of Stalinism are being conserved.

There has, however, been a loosening of Stalin's iron fetters. As a result it is now possible to imagine developments, both evolutionary and revolutionary, in the Soviet Union and in its satellite states which would have seemed unthinkable before Stalin's death. Khrushchev and Bulganin have struck out on a new course with conscious aims and objectives. But they may not be able to foresee or control where or how fast this new course will carry them. Soviet history has entered a more fluid phase

The Dead Souls of Russia's Merchant World

BY VALENTINE TSCHEBOTARIOFF BILL

AMONG the first impressions of a foreigner entering European Russia in the latter part of the nineteenth century would be lively scenes of urban life. No matter where he crossed the frontier and which city he visited first—Petersburg on the Northwestern frontier, the Polish capital of Warsaw, or the Ukrainian capital of Kiev in the West, Odessa or Tiflis in the Southern border region, or even Astrakhan, Saratov, Kazan or Nizhni Novgorod in the East—should he have come via Siberia—the picture would be the same: Large city streets teaming with traffic, wharves crowded with ships unloading bales and crates of merchandise, or busy railroad stations and freight yards, and in the distance the chimney stacks and squat, drab outlines of sprawling factory buildings.

Yet as soon as the foreigner left the frontier region and advanced into the interior of the country, the picture would change abruptly. Rolling fields and meadows everywhere, the sharp zigzag outline of a forest on the horizon perhaps, hamlets and villages nestling on the banks of a quiet, winding stream, cattle grazing in a pasture, and country roads disappearing into the distance. This panorama would not change until the foreigner reached Moscow, where again he would be struck by the hubbub of city life.

For such was the uneven distribution of Russia's urban centers. Moscow, the ancient capital and industrial center with a population of one million, was the one big city in the interior of the country. Besides Moscow, there were eighteen other large towns with a population of 100,000 or more. But with hardly an exception these towns lay close to the frontiers, stretching in a sweeping arc which began in the northwest with Petersburg and its million and a quarter inhabitants, continued southward, and came to an end with Nizhni Novgorod in the east. Between them, toward the end of the nineteenth century, Moscow and the eighteen peripheral cities housed six million people, or nearly half of the total urban population of Russia.

A large percentage of the other half of urban residents lived in

small towns ranging in size from 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. There were 500 such communities according to the census of 1897 and most of them lay in the interior of the country. The eighteen large frontier cities owed their fast growth and vitality to the fact that they were vital centers of commercial and cultural intercourse between Russia and foreign lands. From Petersburg to Odessa they were points of contact between Russia and Europe, while the large towns further east, especially those on the lower and middle Volga, lay on the cross-roads between Russia and Asia. The 500 small towns, on the other hand, usually so quiet and inconspicuous that a passing foreigner would have trouble in distinguishing them from country villages, owed their neglect and stagnation to the fact that the growth of domestic markets and local exchange of goods lagged far behind the advances made by foreign trade and concentration of industrial production. For only a few decades had passed since the abolition of serfdom, since the days when the majority of Russian households were closed, self-sufficient units which satisfied most of their simple wants through home production, buying but little on the side.

If the visiting foreigner leafed through the great works of Russian fiction in search of a description of those large cities which impressed him at the start of his sojourn in Russia with the brisk, quick pace of their trade and industry, he would be strangely disappointed. He would find Petersburg portrayed as the majestic but cold, forbidding, city of state officialdom. He would read about Moscow as the scene of crucial and decisive events in the history of the country. He would find engrossing scenes from the life of the Russian nobility and civil servants. He would be charmed by the poetic beauty of rural scenes and gripped by the stark realism in the description of suffering and privation endured by the lower classes. But nowhere would he find the figure of the large-scale industrialist, business man and merchant, whose activities were so evident in the big cities.

If the inquisitive foreigner then narrowed down his inquiry to those Russian writers known to have devoted their novels and plays to a portrayal of the bourgeois world of business, he would find that they, too, shunned descriptions of the big cities and concentrated their attention on the small, sleepy, stagnant provincial town. Even when those writers chose Moscow as the scene of action, seldom did a prosperous business section of the city provide the background, nor were the residences of wealthy merchants and industrialists

described, but rather the back alleys on the almost rural outskirts of the city, the dirty unpaved streets flanked with broken fences and tumble-down houses peopled by crude, illiterate, and greedy petty traders, peddlers and shopkeepers.

This choice of theme and locale was motivated by the hostility toward a pecuniary society prevalent among Russia's literary circles. The intellectual premises on which the world of business and industry rested in the West had always remained alien to the Russian mind. Utilitarian philosophy, the tenets of practicality and materialism, the theory of *laissez faire*, private initiative and profit motive, found no response among Russian intellectuals. Their thinking was not motivated by a rational approach to life, by a dispassionate, objective search for truth, but was guided by a deep and burning emotion—compassion for the destitute rural masses of the Russian people. And compassion was incompatible with acceptance of a way of thought which stressed the statistics of profit and loss rather than the suffering of the poor.

Even those nineteenth century intellectuals who advocated Russia's following a course of Westernization and Europeanization, emphasized the moral and ethical aspects of such a course rather than its economic and material implications. The value and dignity of the human individual, the need to free him from oppression, to develop his creative powers, occupied their minds far more than the practical problems of unfettered competition and the advantages of individual enterprise. Russian men of letters were not interested in the positive aspects of Russia's commercial and industrial advance. They did not conceive of this advance as a way to raise the poverty stricken rural masses from the lower depths of human existence, but demanded a radical reconstruction of society and redress of social iniquities. It was the victims and not the leaders of economic progress which held their attention. And while the success of these leaders bespoke itself most eloquently in the large cities, the plight of the victims came most prominently to the fore in the small, dull, and dingy towns. It was here that the clash between Russia's rapidly growing pecuniary economy and her ancient rural and domestic way of life was sharply and painfully evident.

The greatest among Russia's nineteenth century writers, Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy condemned, each in his own way, the world of acquisition and retention and set the mood of hostility toward a monetary culture which permeates Russia's intellectual and literary world throughout all of the nineteenth century. In

1830 Pushkin wrote "The Covetous Knight," a short drama on greed and the power of money. The knight is a rich medieval baron. The climax of the drama, and one of the crowning achievements of Pushkin, is the knight's monologue delivered while he is revelling in the sight of his open trunks filled with gold coins. Each sentence is packed with titanic intensity and exultation. The knight is unmoved by the thought that each coin represents tears, blood, and sweat shed by the victims of his greed. He is intoxicated with a feeling of power which the sight of his wealth evokes. As the heaps of gold gleam in the soft, flickering candle light and cast mysterious shadows along the walls of the treasure vault, he utters a triumphant cry: "I reign supreme! What magic glitter!"

No Russian writer has pondered as deeply over the full meaning and implications of this exultant cry as Dostoevsky. None has gazed as attentively at the features of Pushkin's knight. One of the central themes recurrent in all of Dostoevsky's major novels published in the 1860's and 1870's was to treat accumulation of wealth as a fatal, pernicious temptation and calamity of mankind. Dostoevsky considered money only as a medium of power, as a means to "reign supreme" over one's fellow men. He used the figure of the merchant and the business man in his novels to expose and underscore the tragedy of the strong, proud, and lonely figure of the self-willed modern individual to whom power and self assertion appear as the supreme goal in life.

During the same decades that Dostoevsky published his masterpieces, Tolstoy, too, was writing his greatest novels *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*. In these, as in most of his other works of fiction, he ignored the world of commerce and industry, seeing the Russian scene set between nobleman and peasant. Yet in the subsequent decades Tolstoy directed powerful and concentrated blows against the cruel and ugly world of selfish materialism through his philosophical and religious treatises. He struck at the fundamental issues of an acquisitive society by upholding the ideal of poverty, extolling the virtue of brotherly love, and denying all salubrious effects of contemporary civilization and egotistic pursuits of material betterment.

This fundamental indictment of a pecuniary society by Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy was forceful and decisive and so spaced in time that hardly a decade of the nineteenth century escaped from its impact. But it did not present a clear and full picture of the workings of such a society. A close scrutiny of the world of

Russia's merchants and industrialists has been the goal of three other writers: the playwright Alexander Ostrovsky, the satirist Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, and the novelist Maxim Gorky. Each devoted a substantial, even dominant part of his creative writing to the theme of the small, drab, and stagnant town or suburb, inhabited by oppressors and victims, rather than heroes and villains.

The hostility of these writers toward the world they describe is expressed from the start in the name of the imaginary town which forms the scene of the plot. Shchedrin chooses "Idiotville" for his *History of a Town*, Gorky speaks of "Sleepy Hollow," "Thieftown," and "Okurov" which derives from the Russian word for cigarette butt, *okurok*, to indicate the hopeless uselessness of this community. How restrained and impartial Sinclair Lewis' "Gopher Prairie" and even Charles Dickens' "Coketown" seem in comparison to this contemptuous and abusive nomenclature.

The insignificance of the towns is stressed through the impression they convey from afar. They do not rise and beckon like independent, prosperous citadels, but, rather, merge with the surrounding flat and monotonous countryside. They seem like pinpoints on the horizon or like small toys resting on the wide, wrinkled palm of an outstretched hand. A closer look at the town adds to this impression of insignificance a feeling of its crippled, stunted, thwarted, unhealthy growth. The community does not form an organic, closely knit entity. A river—in the case of Okurov it is called "Confusion" (*Putanitsa*)—bisects the town into two hostile and unequal parts. On its steep bank live the prosperous residents—the mayor, judge, sheriff, tax inspector, doctor, postmaster, the clergy, and the successful merchants. The low, flat bank which sinks muddily to the river and is flooded every spring, is where the poor live.

The only time members of the well-to-do group cross the river and appear in the slum area is surreptitiously at night, to visit the house of prostitution which is the only large and substantial building in this section of the town. The rest are hovels, blackened with age, ravaged by floods and precariously supported by rotting beams. The inhabitants of these hovels live on the scanty returns from simple crafts such as the making of brooms, bird cages, fish nets, and crude wooden utensils. In the summer time they also pick wild berries and mushrooms and sell them across the river. The women work as maids and cooks in the houses of the prosperous citizens, bringing home gossip, invective, and venomous feelings toward their

employers. Hostility also thrives between the town and the nearby countryside. Peasants are afraid to pass through the slum area except in groups of four or five for fear of being robbed and beaten. The townspeople, in turn, complain of the peasants' greed and dishonesty and maintain that the Emancipation has demoralized and corrupted the rural population.

The heavy gloom hovering over the town is intensified by the presence of an old, gray prison on its outskirts, while at the other end of town a large, dilapidated and abandoned manor house stands as a reminder of the declining fortunes and fading vitality of the Russian nobility. The manor house is a symbol of the past, the prison house a symbol of the present—an image of misery, defeat, and oppression, stunting life and inflicting crippling mutilations upon the helpless and the weak. Oppression begins at the top of the social structure of the urban community. It is practiced by the official authorities of the town who seldom hesitate to usurp the power of their position in dealing with the people entrusted to their care. Yet these men are usually portrayed with burlesque brilliance and grim humor rather than accusing sorrow and indignant defiance. Writing the chronicle of Idiotville, the satirist Shchedrin enumerates the fate and achievements of the successive mayors of the town. There was one who was found dead in bed, devoured by bed bugs. Another who was very tall and prided himself on being a relation of Ivan the Great, the famous belfry in Moscow, broke in two during a severe storm. Still another was deeply interested in the female sex and died of exhaustion after doubling the population of Idiotville.

The practices of a small town judge are described by Ostrovsky in the play *A Passionate Heart*. To a group of people brought to court the judge shows three voluminous law books. In the first book, he says, the law is strict, in the second it is even stricter, and in the third it is strictest of all. Then, turning to the defendants, he poses the question: "Do you want me to judge you by the law or by my heart and soul?" The defendants fall on their knees and implore the judge "to be a father," to judge them by his heart and soul.

But exploitation of the ignorance and helplessness of the people by the authorities was one of the lesser manifestations of fettering constraints endured by residents of Idiotville, Thieftown, Sleepy Hollow, Okurov, and their numberless counterparts. The center of oppression, grim, relentless, and formidable, was the house of the local merchant and factory owner. If the ghost of a sixteenth century

Muscovite tradesman had been able to visit this house, he would have readily recognized and understood the pattern of life of his nineteenth century descendant and successor. For the quiet and somnolent monotony permeating the life of the provincial town kept innovations at bay and reduced change to a minimum. Like his sixteenth century predecessor, the nineteenth century trader as seen by Shchedrin, Ostrovsky, and Gorky, considered himself an unlimited autocrat in his house, entitled to issue orders and to expect unconditional obedience and submission from everyone living under his roof. Frequently acting like Ivan the Terrible in miniature, he derived deep satisfaction from inducing fear and seeing people tremble. When Ilia Artamonov in Gorky's *The Artamonov Business* is told that he is greatly disliked by the townspeople of Sleepy Hollow, he replies that it is fear, not affection he is looking for. "I know how to break people," he adds, "and I can do without love."

Seeing the world divided into the rigid and hostile camps of masters and slaves, imposes deadening constraints on the mind of Ilia Artamonov and those who are like him. The sole purpose of their existence is to make money, to perpetually increase their wealth in order to remain and to rise in the hierarchy of the masters. "When someone speaks of money to me, my insides begin to burn," says the merchant Dikoi in Ostrovsky's *Thunderstorm*. Caught in the toils of this soulless travail, these men are unable to comprehend and appreciate anything beyond the narrow confines of profit and loss arithmetic. No expedient is neglected to increase profits, even if dishonesty is involved. Fraud is developed into a professional skill, an art of deceiving in such a way as not to be deceived in turn. Debts are ignored or eluded, often with mocking insolence, or, on a grander scale, by faking bankruptcy. Not a single bill is paid without insulting the creditor, without showering him with abuse. "You are a worm," says Dikoi to one of his suppliers, "if I feel like it, I shall be generous to you; if I don't—I can crush and squash you." Employees' salaries are paid reluctantly and irregularly. When a clerk of the merchant Akhov in Ostrovsky's play *Even a Cat Has Lean Times* complains of having received too little, Akhov retorts: "No matter how much I give you, you would still steal from me. I only promise you rewards so that you would remember your conscience and steal less."

The merchant's and entrepreneur's home is permeated by the same spirit of tyranny and despotism as his office, warehouse, and factory. Some speak to their wives only to give commands and bark

orders. Most of the women live in constant fear of being beaten. A wife's "education," as Ostrovsky has one bitterly comment, consists of the various methods of beating she has endured—not only with her husband's fists, but with fire tongs, logs and bricks as well, to say nothing of the times her head was knocked against a wall or table. Sometimes a rich merchant will surround his wife with ostentatious luxuries, but at the same time keep her in strict seclusion and idleness, as was the custom among wealthy Muscovite families of the sixteenth century. The merchant Kharkunov in Ostrovsky's *A Heart Is Not a Stone* took his wife to the theatre once. But when he noticed a stranger staring at her, he took her home at once, even though the curtain had not yet gone up on the stage. This was her only outing in twenty years. Whenever she wanted new clothes, a selection was sent to her house for her to choose from. And nearly every week her husband brought her a new piece of jewelry, although he seldom spent an evening at home. Gradually she lost even the desire to go out.

The children of men like Akhov or Kharkunov grow up under the shadow of their father's despotism, disposing of their lives and destiny as if they were inanimate parts of his inventory. A merchant's daughter is not slated to marry the man she loves, but the man selected for her by her father. Marriage negotiations resemble a sales transaction, in which the size of the dowry is of decisive importance. A merchant's son is expected to follow the career chosen for him by his father. More often than not, this means that his strength will be harnessed and channelled into the family enterprise. Any desire on the part of the children to acquire an education and to engage in intellectual pursuits meets with violent opposition from the bourgeois business men. Like their sixteenth century forefathers, they distrust knowledge and are suspicious of those who seek it. Knowledge, they maintain, does not increase wealth and may, on the contrary, have dangerous effects on people and impede their business prowess. The successful textile entrepreneur and former serf, Ilia Artamonov, comments contemptuously on the "7,000 books" read by his former landlord Prince Ratsky, on his extensive travels and his wide circle of acquaintances. None of these helped the Prince in managing his cloth factory, says Artamonov, which turned into a complete business failure.

The only interest the Ilia Artamonovs, Dikois, Akhovs, and Kharkunovs display toward cultural refinements is motivated by a desire to arouse admiration and envy among their neighbors

and to erase, in their own mind memories of their humble peasant origin and crude village upbringing. The rich contractor Khlynov in Ostrovsky's *A Passionate Heart* buys a musical clock to put over the entrance to his stables, builds elaborate fountains in his garden and arranges a sleigh ride in the middle of summer, the sleigh being drawn across green fields and flowering meadows by twelve young peasant girls. The provincial merchant Gordei Torzov in Ostrovsky's *Poverty is not a Vice* dreams of moving to Moscow or Petersburg where he could "imitate every fashion." Meanwhile he tries to simulate refinement by enriching his vocabulary with literary terms and expressions the meaning of which he but dimly grasps and the spelling of which he grotesquely distorts and mutilates.

Underneath the thin veneer of these pretenses which masquerade as refinement thrives a coarse and brutal barbarism. It is luridly and unforgettably illumined by Gorky in his novel *The Life of Matvei Kozhemiakin* through the description of a meal in a merchant's house. Food—a thick vegetable and meat stew—is served in a large bowl which is set in the center of the table. No plates are used, but everyone is given a wooden spoon. Seating at the table is strictly regulated by rank and seniority, with the master of the house presiding at the head of the table. The meal cannot begin until the master has given the command to start and has taken the first spoonful of broth and vegetables out of the communal bowl. The meat is left, as yet, untouched. When all other ingredients of the stew have been consumed, the master gives a second command: "Go to it!" and the spoons begin to angle for the meat. The master watches carefully that each person snatches only one piece at a time. If, yielding to a particularly hefty appetite, someone catches more than his share, a hard and stern crack over the culprit's forehead with the master's spoon is the rebuke. The food is devoured with animal concentration and avidity. Perspiration drips from oily faces, teeth flash, large red tongues lick grease covered lips and spoons and the general silence is broken only by the sounds of smacking, belching, and sighs of replete contentment and fatigue.

Central to the very structure and meaning of Gorky's and Ostrovsky's plots is the tragedy of the victims of this world of greed, dishonesty, depraved cruelty, and uncouth ignorance. A successful rebellion or even an escape from this crippling and soul crushing bondage is the exception and does not hold the authors' primary and concentrated attention. Ilia Artamonov's oldest grandson becomes a revolutionary, but vanishes as an exile from the reader's view

into the frigid and snowy wastes of Siberia. It is when speaking of the frustration, disaster, and defeat of the victims of brutality and oppression that the narratives swell into a grim and accusing dirge.

Foma Gordeev, the title figure in Gorky's novel, ends up as a helpless, half witted wreck after many unsuccessful attempts to free himself from the chains of his father's business—a large and lucrative boat and barge enterprise on the Volga. The climax of his tragic struggle for freedom comes when Foma publicly insults the leading merchants of the town gathered at the launching of a new steamboat. Spicing his speech with unprintable oaths, he accuses them collectively of being crooks, robbers, and oppressors and goes on to flaunt individual charges at each member of the group. Foma reminds one that he has seduced a minor, another that he got rich operating a house of prostitution, a third of having sent an innocent woman to jail so as to free himself from her and clear the way for a new mistress. The outraged merchants overcome the vituperating orator by brute force and tie his hands and feet. Foma is sent to a mental institution, whence he returns several years later, spent, worn, subdued, and incoherent.

Foma attempted to stage a violent rebellion against greed, dishonesty, and cruelty of the world he lived in. Gorky's Matvei Kozhemiakin vainly seeks to escape from the stifling ignorance, intellectual stagnation, and boredom of Okurov. The slow agony of his life is no less gripping than the tempestuous and raving outbursts of Foma Gordeev.

These two characters are prominent in the long and somber portrait gallery of victims crushed by mercenary barbarism. Next to them ranks Caterina, heroine of the drama *Thunderstorm*, artistically one of the peaks of Ostrovsky's creative power. Both Foma Gordeev and Matvei Kozhemiakin were victims of a whole system. They were crushed and defeated by the bitter pressures of the society they lived in. In *Thunderstorm* the forces of ruthless despotism and uncouth brutality are focussed on two individuals only—the trader Savel Dikoi and the merchant widow Marfa Kabanova. Their very names proclaim their bestiality. *Dikii* is the adjective for "savage" and *kaban* means "boar." Marfa Kabanova is a cold, strict, and inflexible tyrant who runs her house by the rigid rules of conduct and life established in sixteenth century Muscovy. She bullies her shy and gentle son, who is Caterina's husband, turning him into an inept and helpless weakling. Stifled by this atmosphere of heartless regimentation, chafing under the frigid despotism of her mother-in-

law and lacking support and encouragement from her husband, Caterina falls in love with Dikoi's young nephew, Boris. She surrenders to this attachment with the lyrical and romantic intensity of a first love and, at the same time, with the tragic pathos and abandon of a last passion. After confessing her sin to her desolate husband and outraged mother-in-law, Caterina takes her life by jumping off a high cliff into the Volga.

The roots of Ostrovsky's, Shchedrin's, and Gorky's merchant world, devoid of culture, integrity, sincerity and warmth of feeling, reach deep into Russia's past, back to the days when the burden of autocracy and the fetters of serfdom became integral features of Russian life. The barbaric despotism of nineteenth century merchants is closely linked to sixteenth and seventeenth century oppression. The tool of oppression is no longer land, but money. And money has forged a type of slavery more formidable than attachment to the soil was in the days of serfdom. Yet economic and industrial progress in Russia after the Emancipation of 1861 was so swift and startling, changes in the composition and way of life of bourgeois society so rapid and spectacular, that this legacy of bondage waned and paled before the vigorous impact of the present. Neither Ostrovsky, nor Shchedrin, nor Gorky could ignore the fact that the generation of business men which dominated the scene in the 1880's was quite different from their fathers who had come to the fore in the 1860's, and also that the generation which lived to see the opening of World War I was still further removed in outlook and education from the atmosphere pervading the early days of Emancipation.

Ostrovsky died in 1886, Shchedrin in 1889, in a decade when cultural and economic advance of the bourgeoisie was just beginning to gather speed, after a slow though steady forward march since 1861. The parting glances of Ostrovsky at the business world noted that the merchants had shaved their Muscovite beards and were dressed in European clothes instead of the old fashioned coats, baggy trousers, and knee-high leather boots of former days. Ostrovsky also observed that the scope of their enterprises had grown and their interests and knowledge had increased. The rich provincial businessman, Knurov, in *Dowerless*, a play published in 1879, is seen reading a French newspaper. But his arrogance and haughtiness still match that of the older generation. There are only two or three people in town whom he will condescend to address. The shipowner Paratov in the same play remarks that the bourgeoisie has now arrived at the helm and adds sardonically that this means

the dawn of a truly "golden age." For art is now being valued in gold.

Shchedrin's satire, *A Contemporary Idyl*, includes an account of the life of the merchant Paramonov given exclusively in figures and expenditures from the year of his birth in 1818 to the year 1880. The largest sums, many of them in tens of thousands of rubles, were spent on a wide assortment of bribes, while the smallest, in the amount of fifteen kopeks, was contributed to a fund for the erection of a monument for Pushkin. In the same book appears the wealthy textile entrepreneur, Kubyshkin, who finances the publication of a daily newspaper *Verbal Fertilizer*. The leading editorials are devoted to the theme of excluding all foreign textiles and all domestic fabrics, except Kubyshkin's, from the Russian market.

Gorky died in 1936 and was, therefore, the only one among the three writers who focussed their attention on the bourgeois world to view its full rise and fall in retrospect. The cultural advances made by Russia's men of business toward the turn of the century are significantly commented upon by Gorky in *The Life of Klim Samgin*, a broad panoramic canvas of the last forty years of Tsarist Russia. In the opening years of the twentieth century, Klim's wife Varvara is hostess at an intellectual "salon." Here people talk about Russia's rapidly increasing wealth, they discuss the fact that merchants such as those described by Ostrovsky hardly exist any more, that a new type of industrialist is emerging who is interested in culture, art, and politics. But all this was discussed in unfriendly terms. With pleasure people spoke of students' revolts, workers' strikes, rural destitution, and mediocrity among civil servants.

At about the same time that Varvara's salon voices its hostility toward the undeniable progress among Russia's men of business, there occurs the death of the chief representative of this group in the book, the real estate and newspaper owner Timothy Varavka. This corpulent man is clearheaded, observant, and filled with boundless, restless energy. Yet he instantly evokes in the reader a feeling of distaste through his habit of wiping his face with his beard to remove perspiration. During the past twenty-five years Varavka has built some thirty stone houses in a town where wooden structures predominate. These stone buildings stand out "like patches on a worn coat" and impart "a hideous appearance to the formerly quaint town." He dies of heart disease, swollen to monstrous grossness, lamenting "I've built and built and have not built anything worthwhile. . . ."

The same sense of futility permeates the history of three generations of an industrialist's family which Gorky traces in *The Artamonov Business*. Ilia Artamonov, vigorous, energetic, and tirelessly at work as a textile entrepreneur since he was freed as a serf in 1861, conveys the impression of an ape; when he lowers his arms his finger tips reach down to his knees. He bleeds to death from a ruptured blood vessel after straining to move an overturned piece of newly arrived machinery. His last words resemble those of Varavka: "I was mistaken," he whispers, "dear God, so mistaken." The nature of his mistake is not clarified, but his children live to show that their father's textile factory was indeed a mistake. Ilia's hunchback son Nikita retreats to a monastery, although he no longer believes in God, and Piotr is reluctantly compelled to take over the management of the factory for which he always had intense dislike. From a fresh and cheerful lad he gradually turns into a sullen, dissatisfied, and bored old man, who feels himself no longer master, but slave of the enterprise. In the third generation the strength and vigor which bubbled over in Ilia Artamonov and receded in his sons, reaches an even lower ebb. Piotr's son Jacob is a fat, indolent, insensitive man who cares for nothing but his immediate bodily comfort, while Jacob's cousin Miron, thin, bespectacled, and haughty, hopes to escape from the factory to a political career as a member of the Duma. The last pages of the book are illuminated by the sinister glow of the revolutionary firebrand of 1917. Piotr Artamonov is dying, vaguely conscious that something unbearably and incomprehensibly terrible is happening to his world.

This, then, was the merchant world as seen by Gorky, Ostrovsky, and Shchedrin, a cruel and ugly world of small, dingy towns and dirty streets peopled with monstrous tyrants and crippled misfits. It is a grim counterpart and sequel to Gogol's rural landscape inhabited by Dead Souls magically alive through the intensity of the vices each is representing—those of dreamy idleness, greed, stupidity, insolence, cunning, coarseness, and avarice. Gogol saw all these evils, so masterfully clad in human guise, dangerously encroaching upon Russian life during his lifetime, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Like Gogol, Ostrovsky, Shchedrin, and Gorky were unable to divert their glance from the dark and ugly aspects of Russian life which they portrayed. A dispassionate account of the cultural progress of bourgeois society and its prominent leaders and representatives lay beyond the bounds of their faculties. All were driven by compassion for the weak and the poor and spellbound by

the wrongs and injustices inflicted upon the helpless and the destitute. Objectivity, scepticism, a bent for dispassionate analysis had never figured among the strong assets of the Russian mind.

Alongside the powerful surge of pity and sympathy which determined the direction of Russian thought throughout the nineteenth century, there was yet another force which had always exerted a strong fascination and attraction upon the Russian mind—a thirst for harmony and a quest for beauty. An early testimonial of the power of this force upon the Russians can be found as far back as the tenth century, in the legendary account of Prince Vladimir's adoption of the Greek Orthodox creed in preference to other contemplated religions. According to the legend, his choice was determined by the beauty of the Orthodox church service. The same esthetic quest for harmony can be detected in the outstanding monuments of Russian culture, and the response these treasures found among the Russian people, from Rublev's ikon of the Holy Trinity to Pushkin's verses.

That this force had lost none of its power upon the Russian mind by the late nineteenth century is evidenced by the lively interest of leading business men in art,—painting, music, and the theatre. It was an interest which went far beyond the bounds of financial subsidies and support of artistic ventures. It was a deep and sincere, often passionate devotion to art, a thirst for beauty, which led to a close and warm personal relationship of the men of trade and industry with prominent contemporary painters, actors, and musicians. Numerous comments by members of the artistic world bear evidence of this fruitful and harmonious alliance. Vivid accounts and records of the personalities and activities of prominent Russian industrialists are to be found in the memoirs of such men as the opera singer Fedor Shaliapin, the stage managers Konstantin Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko, the painter Vasily Polenov, and in Igor Grabar's biographies of the artists Valentin Serov and Ilia Repin. These accounts read as if they were written about people from another planet, if compared to the character creations of Ostrovsky, Shchedrin, or Gorky.

The artists saw the men at the uppermost end of the industrial and commercial scale. The writers gazed at the bottom of the pit. And the chasm between the esthetic and the humanitarian quest of the Russian mind was never bridged.

The Posthumous Life of Dostoevsky

BY RENÉ FUELOEP-MILLER

DOSTOEVSKY was a contemporary of such masters of modern fiction as Dickens, Flaubert, Zola, Hawthorne, Tolstoy, and Turgenev. Yet none of these great novelists can match the decisive and ever-increasing impact which Dostoevsky had on the development of the modern novel. He created a new realism that fuses the real with the imaginary, the here and now with eternity, the base with the sublime, the conscious with the unconscious, thus portraying the complexity and fullness of life. Dostoevsky's realism opened new vistas, changed the course of fiction and paved the way for the twentieth century novel.

But aside from his influence on literary trends, no other novelist managed to come to grips so thoroughly with all the essential questions of life: good and evil, love and hate, doubt and faith, self-assertion and divine law, determinism and free will, crime and punishment, and the conflict between society and the unbridled individual. All the problems that have troubled, and are still troubling, man's mind and are of urgent concern to religious thinkers of all creeds, to political conservatives and radicals, and to psychiatrists of conflicting schools—are part and parcel of the fictional world of Fyodor Dostoevsky.

He was called "the father of the modern novel," "one of the greatest religious geniuses of the nineteenth century," "the forerunner of psychoanalysis and psychological criminology," "a great seer" who, eighty years ago, predicted war, disintegration, secularization, social turmoil, communism, fascism, and existentialism. The word "prophet, prophet!" which burst from an enthusiastic audience at the conclusion of Dostoevsky's famous Pushkin memorial speech, has been confirmed by contemporary history.

While the Pushkin address, which Dostoevsky delivered only a few months before his death, was the starting point of his fame, his funeral, which took place seventy-five years ago, was not only the beginning of his immortality but foreshadowed his significance which was to transcend all social, political, and religious barriers.

In order to honor the deceased genius both Church and State decided to hold a semi-official funeral at which the court, the government, the clergy and other important institutions were represented.

As the cortège of mourners approached the Alexander Nevsky Monastery, where the coffin was to be placed in the church, the gates of the monastery opened and the monks marched out in solemn procession—an honor ordinarily reserved for a Tsar's funeral.

At midnight the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg appeared in the church to deliver a prayer for the dead. Looking down into the nave of the church, he saw to his alarm that the elegant dignitaries, deputies, and merchants were outnumbered by a mass of radicals; men with scotch plaids thrown over their shoulders, bespectacled women with short hair, servants, beggars, tramps, half-wits. The host of the insulted and injured who populate Dostoevsky's novels had gathered to pay him their last respects. The monks' voices rose shakily in the singing of the psalms, but then the insulted and injured took over the song and a tremendous chorus roared through the nave. The hymns were sung more movingly and with greater feeling than they had ever been heard before.

At the tomb young princes and grand dukes, resplendent priests, workers and vagrants, conservatives and radicals, Slavophiles and Westerners mourned together. All Russia seemed to have journeyed to Dostoevsky's grave to honor the dead man who was the revolutionary fighter for freedom, the spokesman of the conservatives, the friend of the heir apparent, and the brother of the downtrodden masses.

Tolstoy was the first among the great writers who fully recognized Dostoevsky's supremacy. "Usually the intellect and artistic gifts of others wakens envy in me," he remarked, "but I have always felt differently toward Dostoevsky. It never occurred to me to match my work against his." Even after Tolstoy turned his back on art and literature and rejected all products of belles lettres, including his own, he would not dispense with Dostoevsky's novels. The night before his fatal flight he was rereading the chapter about Elder Zossima in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

If Tolstoy recognized Dostoevsky's literary significance, Nietzsche reacted to his phenomenal psychological insight. In 1887 while completing his book *The Will to Power* he came across a newly published French translation of *Notes from the Underground*. "What a lucky find!" he exclaimed, "my joy is immense." And after having read *Crime and Punishment* Nietzsche remarked: "Dostoevsky is the only psychologist who has anything to teach me. I consider my acquaintance with his works one of the finest strokes of luck in my life, even better than my discovery of Stendhal." "But his

morality is precisely what you have called the slave-morality," remonstrated the Danish critic George Brandes. "Quite so," replied Nietzsche. "And yet he remains one of those who has afforded the greatest relief to my mind."

The same year that Nietzsche discovered Dostoevsky, Robert Louis Stevenson read a new English translation of *Crime and Punishment*, and called it "easily the greatest book I have read in ten years. It nearly finished me." The true recognition of Dostoevsky in the Anglo-Saxon world was, however, reserved for later. At first the English temperament was repelled by Dostoevsky's "formless, confused and tumultuous manner" with which he pried into the inner heart of man. Only gradually did they come to admire the alien power of the Russian writer.

"The novels of Dostoevsky are seething whirlpools, gyrating sandstorms, waterspouts which hiss and boil and suck us in," wrote Virginia Woolf. "They are composed purely and wholly of the stuff of the soul. The poetic reconstruction of his characters' inner world so overwhelms us that we forget to ask about the omitted physical descriptions. Nor does it occur to us to wonder about the missing information on time, place, and scene. It is the soul that matters, its passion, its tumult, its astonishing medley of beauty and vileness. In Dostoevsky a new panorama of the human mind is revealed."

When Somerset Maugham was sent to Russia in 1917 on a secret mission he became acquainted with the works of Tolstoy and Turgenev. But they left him cold. "It was not til I came to Dostoevsky that I received a bewildering and arresting emotion," he writes. "Here was something that really had significance for me and I read greedily one after the other of the great novels of Russia's greatest writer. Dostoevsky amazes, terrifies, inspires and perplexes. In comparison with him even Balzac, Stendhal, and Flaubert seemed formal and a little frigid."

E. M. Forster carried the criticism closer to home when he wrote: "No English novelist explored man's soul as deeply as Dostoevsky." And Arnold Bennett expressed the pious wish that "all English novelists should learn from Dostoevsky."

When M. de Vogüé, the French Ambassador to Russia, published his book *Le roman russe* in 1886 he felt he had to apologize for presenting to the French public among other Russian writers "so unclear and nebulous an author as Dostoevsky, whose dubious rise ended with *Crime and Punishment*." He also decided to refrain from a detailed discussion of the "endless and complicated story of

The Brothers Karamazov," asserting that it needs "real courage to read it through to the end." But it turned out that de Vogüé gravely underestimated both Dostoevsky's importance and the courage of his own countrymen.

Before long it became clear that Dostoevsky had a tremendous appeal for the Gallic mind. And since André Gide termed *The Brothers Karamazov* "the greatest novel ever written," there has hardly been a Frenchman with a feeling for literature, who failed to agree with him. When Flaubert still presided over "la littérature qui mange" at the famous dinners Chez Magny, Turgenev was extolled as the true representative of Russia. But now Gide declared: "There never was an author more Russian in the strictest sense of the word, and yet so universally European as Dostoevsky."

Zola, who with his *petits faits vrais* had steered French writing in the direction of documentary realism, regarded Dostoevsky's novels as "regrettable deviations toward the pernicious metaphysical tendencies" against which he had always fought. But he was repudiated by even his most faithful admirers. "While we must travel the main path that Zola took," Huysmans wrote, "we must also look for the paralled route that Dostoevsky has shown us, which takes the airline of the mind to that reality which is concealed behind things."

Marcel Proust, whose approach to literature is as different as can be from Dostoevsky's, nevertheless paid homage to this "great creative genius, whose figures are even more fantastic than the figures in Rembrandt's Night Watch, and yet they are all steeped in profound and extraordinary truths, which are peculiar to Dostoevsky alone."

Speaking for the existentialists, Sartre expressed his highest appreciation for Dostoevsky, saying that Dostoevsky's work of abandoned man is the starting point of the existentialist novel. And Camus drew "a direct line from Sophocles' King Oedipus to Dostoevsky's Kirilov, who combines classical wisdom with modern heroism."

In Germany, after Stefan Zweig pointed out Dostoevsky's towering greatness, admiration for the Russian writer grew from year to year, until it took on sectarian forms. Dostoevsky's doctrine of a Russian Christ was embraced by many Germans during the twenties and became a kind of religious creed. In fact enthusiasm for Dostoevsky permeated German thought to such an extent that Nobel prize-winner Hermann Hesse raised an alarmed voice in protest. While acknowledging Dostoevsky's "undoubtedly great talent," he warned:

"But that the European and particularly the German youth should feel Dostoevsky to be their greatest writer, not Goethe, not even Nietzsche,—that is a fateful and troubling fact. The idea of the Karamazovs is beginning to devour the mind of Germany and Europe, and this I must call the decline of Europe."

But another German Nobel prize-winner, Thomas Mann, could not disagree more. "I am filled with reverence, a deep mystical reverence, for the religious greatness of the damned, before the genius of disease and the disease of genius, before this prototype of the downtrodden and possessed in whom the saint and the criminal are one."

It is not surprising that Dostoevsky, who had conquered the European continent, should be even more highly regarded in his own country. The Russians were best fit to realize the magnitude of this man whose greatness is after all the greatness of Russia itself. Russian writers of such different temperament and outlook as Merezhkovsky, Blok, Berdyaev, and Ivanov shared their admiration for Dostoevsky and praised him as "the genius of compassionate Russian humanitarianism."

Because of this Russian compassionate humanitarianism the rulers of Soviet Russia who set out to dehumanize man, society, art, and literature, embarked on the shameful course of viciously attacking the writer who expressed the greatness of Russia and whom the whole world had come to admire.

This trend was already foreshadowed by one dissenting Russian author of status, Maxim Gorky, who took an anti-Dostoevsky attitude in the pre-Soviet era. "The genius of compassionate Russian humanitarianism? An evil genius of morbid pessimism. An enemy of progress!" thundered Gorky who later at the First Convention of Soviet Writers decreed with his friend Stalin that "all literature must be ideological and realistic," thus propagating "the optimistic literature of the rising class of the proletariat, the only progressive and advanced class." And it was also Gorky who, before World War I, with his fervent protest against the performance of a dramatized version of *The Possessed*, made the first attempt at strangulation of artistic freedom, a practice which was later on skillfully mastered by the Soviet rulers. The intellectual dictatorship devised by comrades Stalin and Gorky and executed by Zhdanov set into motion the cultural purge which pronounced the death sentence over the free and humanitarian genius in art and literature.

Zhdanov came out with a round condemnation of Dostoevsky,

declaring "Just as during his lifetime, so also now Dostoevsky stands in the vanguard of reaction. His works are being exploited widely and universally in the frenzied campaign against man undertaken by Wall Street's literary lackeys. And it is natural that this should be so, because Dostoevsky wasted the entire force of his talent on proving the weakness, insignificance, and vulgarity of human nature. This type of literature seeks to corrupt the souls of men, crush their will to struggle, and justify the insane violation to which the rulers of the bourgeois world are subjecting people." When later on Kirpotin and Dolinin attempted an "ideological whitewash" of Dostoevsky they were quickly called on the carpet by David Zaslavsky, who opposed "the idealization of Dostoevsky, the spiritual father of double dealing treachery."

Now, in 1956, the same men who once were ardent followers of all-powerful and omniscient Father Stalin and helped to create the Stalin myth, suddenly discovered at the 20th Party Congress that Stalin's dictatorship was in all its manifestations an evil and unfortunate digression from Lenin's original concepts. With the new platform of "peaceful co-existence" with the West, which includes "fruitful cultural exchange" with the formerly despised "literary lackeys of Wall Street," it is not surprising that today's Soviet leaders also reversed their attitude toward Dostoevsky and discovered the possibility of co-existing with this "morbidly pessimistic enemy of progress," the author of *The Possessed*.

So today when the whole world is commemorating the 75th anniversary of Dostoevsky's death, the Soviet rulers have found a way to fall in with the general chorus of praise. They have even published an unabridged version of Dostoevsky's total work, of course with the characteristic *reservatio mentalis* of their co-existence doctrine, i.e. at a price which only American capitalists can afford to pay. And since you have to buy the whole work, there is little danger that Dostoevsky's prophetic condemnation of totalitarianism will reach and confuse the faithful Soviet masses who are now commanded to pledge allegiance to Khrushchev's "collective dictatorship."

Reviewing the universal literary conquest by Dostoevsky it is rather awe inspiring that this posthumous victory was accomplished by a man who, after having completed more than twenty novels and tales wrote in a letter to one of his admirers: "I must confess to you that in the anguished moments when I try to draw up a reckoning

with myself, I reach the painful conclusion that in all my works I have not said the twentieth part of what I have to say."

When we ask about the reason for the irresistible posthumous fascination of Dostoevsky, which forced even his red adversaries to lay down their arms and raise the white flag of surrender, we discover that the whole answer cannot be found in his literary achievement alone. And we may agree with Einstein who remarked: "Dostoevsky gives me more than any scientist. He gives me *ethical* satisfaction!"

Soviet Historians in Rome

By S. V. UTECHIN

THE participation of the Soviet historians in the Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences, which was held in Rome in September, 1955, was one of the first occasions of this kind since the post-Stalin thaw in Soviet internal and external policies. As a result, and an outward expression of this thaw, the Soviet historians' participation was of considerable interest at the time, but it has become even more remarkable in the light of subsequent developments.

The "Geneva Spirit," as it was called at the time, was undoubtedly responsible for the broad smiles, the ostensible sweetness and tolerance and the fervent appeals for international academic cooperation which were so characteristic of the official bearing of the Soviet delegation. The changed political climate at home was reflected in the comparative freedom with which they were able to move about the city, to talk both among themselves and to other members of the Congress, and even, in the case of one or two senior members of the delegation, to bring their wives with them. On informal occasions they were refreshingly different from each other in their behavior and conversation. These things, which have since become so familiar in the conduct of Soviet delegations abroad, were then new and in significant contrast to the all-embracing uniformity of the Stalin era.

The delegation was a mixed one: apart from the interpreters it was made up of internationally known scholars such as Professor A. V. Artsikhovskiy and Academician E. A. Kosminsky, a number of younger but well-established historians, some people whose function at home is predominantly political, like Academician A. M. Pankratova (the leader of the delegation) who is a member of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and one or two representatives of the security organs. Only two members had ever attended an international historical congress before: Kosminsky, the 6th Congress in Oslo in 1928, and Pankratova, the 7th in Warsaw in 1933. For many members of the delegation (there were about twenty-five in all, the fifth largest at the Congress) it was the first time they had ever been out of Russia. The older people seemed reserved and tended to keep rather to

themselves, showing little eagerness to mix informally with their foreign colleagues. The younger ones, on the contrary, were much more uninhibited, and showed pleasure in getting into conversation with foreigners—they did not hesitate to walk up and down the halls of the Congress building talking to them, to introduce them among themselves, or to go off with them to the bar for a drink. Even personal contact, sometimes friendly, with Russian émigré historians was possible. Except for clapping in a rather obviously regimented manner at every speech by a "People's Democratic" delegate, they were almost indistinguishable from a normal group of scholars attending an international meeting.

It was obviously intended that the members of the Soviet team should play a large part in the work of the Congress. However, their original desire to present forty papers could not be met—partly, at any rate, because their participation in the Congress was not made known until only a few months before it opened. The number of contributions was then cut down to less than twenty, and these were printed by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and privately distributed at the Congress. One paper was printed in all three Western languages: "The Basic Problems and Some Achievements of Soviet Historical Science," by Professor A. L. Sidorov, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences and Grekov's successor as the Director of its Institute of History. This gave a useful survey of the organization of historical research and teaching in the U.S.S.R., the main periodical and serial publications, and the chief works that have appeared during the last twenty years. More or less supplementary to this report were three other papers, including E. Kosminsky's "The Basic Problems of West European Feudalism in Soviet Historical Research" and A. A. Novoselsky's and V. I. Shunkov's on "The Publication of Historical Sources in the U.S.S.R.," which was not read at the Congress.

The rest of the papers can be divided into three categories: those that were purely scientific, those that contained a judicious admixture of political propaganda, and those that contained nothing but propaganda. To the first group belonged the papers by Academician V. V. Struve and U. P. Frantzev—"New Data on the Chronology of the Ancient East" (read); by B. B. Piotrovsky—"New Contributions to the Study of Ancient Civilizations in the U.S.S.R."; by A. V. Artsikhovskiy—"The New Discoveries in Novgorod" (read); and by the young historian J. Knorozov entitled "A Brief Summary of the Study in the Soviet Union of the Ancient Maya Hieroglyphic

Writing," which in fact was an account of the author's own work of deciphering. In the second group were eight papers on various subjects of European and Russian history, only one of which was actually read at the Congress—Professor V. M. Khvostov's "The Franco-Russian Alliance and Its Historical Relevance." To the third and last category belonged the papers by A. M. Pankratova—"The Problem of Historicism and the Contemporary Period," read at the Congress; by Academician I. I. Mints and G. N. Golikov—"The Great October Socialist Revolution and Its Significance for the Historical Destiny of the Peoples of Russia"; and by A. D. Nikonov—"The Origin of World War II and the Pre-war European Political Crisis of 1939."

The participation of Soviet delegates in the discussions was strictly organized. An effort was made to provide speakers for the discussions on every relevant paper; the leading members of the delegation decided who should speak in the various discussions, and the chosen person was informed by the Secretary of the delegation.

With few exceptions their prepared statements at the Congress were extremely dull, doctrinaire, and lifeless. They consisted almost entirely of reiterations of the main points of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology and of professions of faith in this ideology as the necessary theoretical basis for historical study and research. Delivered in remarkably bad French, German, or English, and invariably quite impersonally in the name of "We Soviet historians . . .," all this had a boring and irritating effect upon their foreign colleagues (except, apparently, the "People's Democratic" ones!) and provided no real meeting point for any genuine discussion. The worst were Pankratova's "communication," which gave the impression that she had not read the works of Spengler, Croce, Collingwood, etc., about which she was talking, and the speech by A. Likholat in the discussion of T. C. Cochran's paper on "History and the Social Sciences," which was remarkable for its unexpected red herring on the subject of the freedom of historical research. He said that the belief in some Western circles that Soviet scholars are subject to some kind of "thought control" was quite untrue, and that they were entirely free in the choice and treatment of their subjects. This was the more ludicrous since to all appearances it was Likholat himself whose function it was to exercise "thought control" in the Soviet delegation. The notable exceptions, which neither bored nor irritated, were Frantzev's paper and Artsikhovskiy's communication on the results of his excavations in Novgorod; the

description and pictures of his findings—particularly the letters written on birch-bark—were of great interest to the audience and provoked lively discussion.

Their unrehearsed contributions, however (Sidorov's reply to the discussion on his paper, and a small number of spontaneous interventions), which were usually given in Russian and translated by an interpreter attached to the delegation, were much more personal, interesting, and much less rigidly orthodox. Professor Sidorov, for example, was challenged by Dr. Pipes of Harvard to explain an apparent contradiction between his own contention that "Soviet historians are guided in their work by the method of historical materialism" and Kosminsky's statement that "Today, Marxist-Leninist historical theory is the foundation on which the majority of Soviet historians base their research." He replied, quite rightly, that "No one is born a Marxist," and proceeded to say that the majority of Soviet historians of the older generation had been pupils of such pre-revolutionary scholars as Klyuchevsky, Petrushevsky, Lappo-Danilevsky, etc., none of whom were Marxists. Most of their pupils, over a long period and on the basis of their experience, developed into Marxists, but some did not. He named a number of these (apparently preferring to refer mainly to those who are dead), including the late Academician Tarlé, who, he said, "did not like to call himself a Marxist too often"! But even in an unrehearsed speech, the same Sidorov displayed an astonishing narrowness of approach: speaking of Professor H. Seton-Watson's contention that there had been a "Jacobin" wing among the Russian Liberals (meaning that their radicalism inclined them to attach little importance to a stable legal order), he declared that this was an example of impermissible ignorance, for, according to Lenin, it was the Bolsheviks who were Jacobins and the Mensheviks the Girondists—how, then, could Liberals be Jacobins?

Two occurrences at the Congress are particularly interesting in light of what has happened since. During the discussion of Sidorov's paper a Swiss professor suggested that the Soviet historians should prepare a memorandum for the Soviet leaders stating that on the basis of Western European experience it was reasonable to conclude that the Leninist path to socialism through a bloody revolution was not the only one and that the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government should be changed in accordance with this conclusion. Referring to this suggestion, E. A. Stepanova, of the then Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute (now the Institute of

Marxism-Leninism), perpetrated—as it seemed—the most appalling anti-Leninist heresy which drew ironic applause from the audience. If, she said, her Western colleagues believed that their bourgeoisie, prompted by a sense of Christian humility, would peacefully surrender their power, she for her part would wish them good luck. The applause ceased to be ironic when she added that she would be only too glad if other nations were spared the suffering which the Russian people had had to undergo. Who could imagine then that only a few months later the doctrine of different roads to socialism would be proclaimed at the Twentieth Party Congress and at least some of the past suffering of the people deplored by no lesser figure than Khrushchev.

In the same debate a Russian émigré historian, speaking of the study in the Soviet Union of the history of the Communist Party, pointed out two important omissions in Sidorov's report: Beria's pamphlet on the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia, and the official Short Course of Party History—a few years ago hailed as the greatest historical work ever written in Russia. He went on to say that the first of these works (published in 1935) inaugurated, and the second (published three years later) made obligatory a kind of historiography whose purpose was to show that, apart from Lenin, only Stalin and the clique which helped him to gain absolute power after Lenin's death had ever done anything of any importance for the Bolshevik cause; for many years nobody else was mentioned anywhere unless they could be branded as deviationists or traitors. This "Beria school" was still prevalent in 1954-55, as one could see from the books shown on the Soviet stand at the Congress' history book exhibition. The majority of important figures in the history of the Communist Party were still "unpersons." When a "People's Democratic" delegate demanded that it should be put on record that this speech had nothing to do with the purposes of the Congress and was aimed at hindering international cooperation and continuing the Cold War, the Russian historian replied that on the contrary he was in favor of establishing cooperation between Russian historians living abroad and their colleagues in the Soviet Union and was convinced that in the field of Party history it could certainly be fruitful. The official reaction of the Soviet delegation was most unfriendly; Stepanova declared that the Soviet historians were prepared to cooperate with everybody except traitors, while Pankratova, on her return to the Soviet Union, reiterated in *Voprosi Istorii* the charge that "reactionary White

Guard historians" had tried to prevent friendship and cooperation between Soviet and foreign historians. Yet at the Twentieth Party Congress Mikoyan spoke of "scholarly work on the history of our Party and Soviet society" as "perhaps the most backward sector of our ideological work," of books on Party history which "were even regarded as unchallengeable yardsticks in which facts were falsified: some persons were arbitrarily exalted; others got no mention at all," etc. This go-ahead signal led firstly to the elaboration at the Party Congress by Pankratova (who could not conceal her pleasure at Mikoyan's having chosen Likholat as an example of a writer falsifying history!) of the same theme, and secondly to a process of "re-personalizing un-persons" in *Voprosy Istorii* and other Soviet publications.

Even the question of cooperation with Russian émigré scholars was soon reconsidered. Although Pankratova had protested in Rome against the display near the Soviet book stand of the works of the Munich Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., the Institute's authorities soon received a letter from the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences suggesting an exchange of publications!

Alexandre Eck, 1876-1953

In Memoriam

ALEXANDRE ECK, the distinguished Russian medievalist-in-exile and founder of the Société Jean Bodin pour L'Histoire Comparative des Institutions, died in Brussels on March 30, 1953, after a protracted illness. He was born in Polotsk, Russia on December 16, 1876, the son of a laborer. He completed his studies of Slavic philology and Slavic history at the University of Warsaw (then Russian), in 1898, winning a gold medal for an essay entitled "Jan Kollár: Outline of His Life and Activity and His Poem *Slàvy Dcera*" (published in *Varshavskiya Universitetskiya Izvestiya*, 1900). He taught in secondary and higher schools of Warsaw and St. Petersburg until 1903, while continuing, at his University's request, his scholarly training as a future professor of Slavic philology. In 1900, however, Eck became involved in the Russian Social Democratic movement. From 1903 to 1914 his revolutionary activity, first in Russia, then from 1909 as an émigré in France, became the main occupation of his life, excluding both teaching and scholarly pursuits.

The war of 1914 found Eck joining the French Foreign Legion together with many Russian revolutionaries abroad. He rose from the ranks to a lieutenant's commission. When the war ended, he settled in Paris to teach at the Russian gymnasium there. In 1921 he was called by Henri Pirenne to fill the newly created chair of Russian History at the University of Ghent in Belgium. Thus began Professor Eck's long teaching and scholarly activity in that country which lasted to the very moment of his death.

He taught in French at Ghent until the University became Flemish in 1930, whereupon he was offered the new chair of Russian History founded at the University of Brussels, thus pioneering for the second time in Belgium in the field of teaching Russian history. He taught there as professor extraordinary from 1934 until his retirement in 1947.

As a teacher Eck was a rigorous master of the scholarly method. His lectures were perfectly organized and delivered with sober elegance in impeccable French. In his seminars he always insisted on an intensive interpretation of texts. He proved to be at Ghent, and, especially, at Brussels, a most active and successful promoter of Slavic studies. When the Oriental Institute was created as a part

of the University of Brussels, Eck's initiative led, in 1933, to the extension of its scope, first to Russian history, and, a year later, to the entire field of Slavic history. In 1936, the Institute having been reorganized into a school with a regular four-year curriculum leading to the usual university degrees, Eck became Director of its section of Slavic philology and history which he conceived and organized as a full-fledged School of Slavic Studies.

Among Eck's fruitful ideas in Brussels, that of an international association for the comparative study of the history of institutions, was particularly successful. It led to the foundation in June, 1935, at a meeting of French and Belgian historians held in Brussels, of the Société Jean Bodin pour L'Histoire Comparative des Institutions which survived World War II and became an important center of scholarly and publishing activity.

World War II meant for Professor Eck resumption of military duty, in spite of being sixty-three years of age. He served first in the Military Intelligence of the French Armée de l'Orient, and later in the British Intelligence Service, where he earned several awards as well as the rank of captain.

With the end of the war, Eck returned to teaching in the reopened University of Brussels. He taught there until the age of seventy. The last six years of his life, from his retirement in 1947 to his death, were devoted to his cherished Société Jean Bodin.

Alexandre Eck's scholarly legacy is both distinguished and considerable. Impressed by it, any friend of Slavic historical and philological scholarship will regret the gap of years between his revolutionary activity (followed by the war) and his resumption of scholarly work in 1921.

In Ghent he prepared his *magnum opus*, *Le Moyen Age russe*, completed in April, 1930, and published in 1933, the result of years of meticulous preparation. Prefaced by Henri Pirenne, this volume offers to the Western European historian a social history of Suzdal-Muscovite Russia of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, based on a thorough first-hand study of documents. This includes, in French translation, the most accurate equivalent of French medieval terminology. It is heavily annotated (1,437 notes in the appendix, besides scores of footnotes) and represents a monumental feat of scholarship. The book became a classic source of information for Western European scholars on the institutional and economic history of north-eastern Russia in the aforementioned period. It is a very reliable source, too, for views generally accepted as non-

controversial by the majority of Russian historians on the eve of 1917, i.e., those of the Solov'ev-Kluchevsky school, although Professor Eck stresses more strongly than the latter various phenomena of Russian medieval history which resemble those of Western feudalism.

Besides *Le Moyen Age russe*, Eck produced numerous studies published between 1930 and 1949 in *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, *Byzantion*, *Archives d'Histoire du Droit Oriental*, *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, and other Belgian and French journals. In these essays Eck was particularly attracted by legal institutions of the Russian Middle Ages. Thus, he studied not only such topics as the legal status of the non-free population and the rights of women, but even more technical matters as, for instance, the inheritance law. He also delivered, in 1934-35, a series of lectures on Russian customary law at the Extension University in Brussels (Institut des Hautes Études de Belgique). This interest in the history of law proper which caused Eck to faithfully attend the meetings of the Société d'Histoire du Droit in Paris was consistent with his institutional approach to history generally, and it parallels the interest taken in the problems of the history of legislation by the great Kluchevsky. Eck, who was not a lawyer by training, in treating problems of legal history shunned technicalities, primarily stressing social aspects. Here he displayed considerable skill, as in every study he undertook, whether history of art, mythology, folklore, or literature.

Professor Eck, whom I came to know intimately between 1934 and 1939, first as his student then as his collaborator and colleague, did much to promote the knowledge of Russian medieval history in Western Europe. He could have produced more if it were not for the revolutions and wars of our epoch to which he paid a heavy tribute. What he did produce is a major contribution to Russian historical learning. His work has been universally recognized as such in Western historical literature, where no problem of Russian medieval history is mentioned without reference to his *Le Moyen Age russe*. In Russia, however, under the present regime which the late scholar hated so much, there is complete silence on his scholarly production. May one express the hope that in his native land as well, political evolution will lead eventually to final recognition of Alexandre Eck's achievement during his years of exile, in the field of Russian historical scholarship and culture.

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MARC SZEFTTEL

Book Reviews

DALLIN, DAVID J. *The Changing World of Soviet Russia*. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1956. 422 pp. \$5.00.

One of the most perceptive and accurate analyses made of the U.S.S.R. during the war-time "alliance" was David Dallin's *The Real Soviet Russia*. The climate of the time prevented this little study from receiving its full and proper due, a situation which was partially repeated when a second edition of the book was brought out in 1947. Both editions are now out of print which makes this new volume all the more valuable and welcome. Those who come fresh to *The Changing World of Soviet Russia* without having read the earlier and briefer book will find Mr. Dallin's latest effort both very interesting and very informative.

Readers who recall the earlier book or who have followed Mr. Dallin's writings in *The Yale Review*, *The New Leader*, or elsewhere may be troubled by a haunting sense of familiarity—of "having been here before." Much of the older book, including figures and quotations, has been incorporated in the new though much fresh material has also been added. Aside from repetitive passages, similarity springs from Mr. Dallin's general approach. For one thing, he believes that: "The social revolution in Russia lasted about two decades . . . and by the end of the 1930's it was virtually completed. Subsequent developments brought about only partial changes but not a profound transformation of the substance of the new system. This is why facts, charts and figures throughout this

chapter [and other chapters, it may be added] show the social composition of prewar Russia as compared with 1940."

More comprehensive is Mr. Dallin's prefatory statement: "As for the basic ideas of the original work, however, there has been, I regret to say, no reason to negate or retract anything said in 1944-47 . . . the facts . . . have not refuted my views." Such statements invite the criticism that the author, by his own confession, has learned nothing and forgotten nothing. But such a criticism would be both inaccurate and unfair. Mr. Dallin has continued to follow Soviet twists and developments with conscientious care. His analysis takes account of events through 1955, and he is not blind to the changes that have taken place. His thesis is not that there have been no changes but that which he calls the "two principal elements of initial, orthodox Communism . . . state economy and political dictatorship . . . have remained unchanged." It is his further thesis that "The new Soviet intelligentsia is destined to play a decisive role in the internal changes confronting Russia."

Mr. Dallin sees in the intelligentsia ". . . the only great social force capable of initiative and activity . . . the dominant element in the social life . . ." and one which is bound to come to the fore in politics also. His long-range prediction is that this group will eventually lead Russia and the world to better days. His phrasing is more felicitous: "Russia, reshaped and transformed and longing for freedom, will embark upon new paths leading to

liberty and security for herself and the other nations of the world." Unlike Mr. Dulles who recently set up a ten-year timetable for such an eventuality, Mr. Dallin makes no prediction as to when this welcome change will take place. "The road," he warns, "is long, dark, beset by pitfalls and frustrations. But at the end stands a better Russia and a better world."

The optimism of the author (and of the Secretary of State) may be justified. One certainly hopes that it is. But it does not seem wholly in accord with the facts and views presented by Mr. Dallin in this book. The working class, he reports, is docile; the peasants will not initiate any great domestic upheavals; the present upper class will "proceed along the road of hierarchism" and will remain socially "at the head of the nation." The only positive hope for major change which the author sets forth is "a decisive conflict between the Army and the GB." This, he notes, has long been predicted but "so far these expectations and predictions have proved unfounded. . . ."

The special contributions of *The Changing World of Soviet Russia*, in addition to its general, over-all value which is considerable, lie in Dallin's excellent, concise, analyses of Trotskyism and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union plus his short concluding chapter. The latter seems to represent, in a sense, the fruits of years of assiduous and acute study. Whether one accepts Mr. Dallin's conclusions or not, they merit respect as the matured and considered judgments of one of the outstanding specialists in a difficult and complex field.

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ROBERTS, HENRY L. *Russia and America. Dangers and Prospects.* Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956. 251 pp. \$3.50.

This book is the outcome of two years of study and discussion by a distinguished group of responsible Americans. The author-editor has recently become director of the Russian Institute at Columbia and is a professional historian of deservedly high repute. If the book leaves the reader with a feeling that somehow and somewhere he has heard all this before, and that little that is new has been added to his understanding of the problem, the reason may well lie in the nature of the problem rather than in any lack in knowledge or understanding on the part of Professor Roberts and his eminent collaborators. It may, indeed, be precisely because those who took part in the discussions were so fully aware of the real limitations on innovation in foreign policy, so unprepared to advocate courses of action of which the end-product cannot be reckoned, and so free from any illusions about the nature of the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, that very often they seem to be doing little more than providing a theoretical framework by which to justify decisions already taken by the United States and its allies in the course of the last few years.

It is possible that this is unfair, that the state of mind of the audience to which this book is addressed in the United States is different from that which the present reviewer (writing in June, 1956) imagines it to be; that a sober warning on the limitations of positive

action in the direction either of greater friendliness towards the present Soviet leaders or of more direct pressure against them is more necessary than he thinks. There are circles in Britain, and still more in France (and from a different point of view, in Western Germany), where some, at least, of the book's warnings and prescriptions might seem much more controversial than they are likely to be to professional students of Soviet affairs. It is also possible that one tends to pick up a book dealing with this subject at the present moment with rather more expectation than usual of receiving some new insight into the course of Soviet development than in fact it offers. After all, things are happening, and there is indeed a perceptible difference in tone and in the distribution of emphasis between the main body of the book and the introduction, presumably written at a later date, which we owe to one of the members of the study group, Mr. John J. McCloy. There is, for instance, in Mr. McCloy's pages a greater insistence on the positive advantage of encouraging contacts across the iron curtain and particularly with the satellites; there is a realization that the reunification of Germany raises not only the issue of the status of a united Germany in the general East-West alignment, but more specific questions about its frontiers and the attitude, in this respect, of Poland and Czechoslovakia; and there is a passage (which perhaps errs on the side of optimism) about the new developments in the Middle East.

There is, however, no reason to believe that Mr. McCloy questions the general thesis of the book, namely that the political problem of the United States and its allies is

conditioned by two stubborn facts—first, that the Soviet Union and China are governed according to ideologies which by their very nature are a threat to the free world and that equally, the development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons means ruling out any recourse by the free world to the use of force to redress the balance upset by Communist advances following World War II. What the authors were looking for was something more than just "containment," as the answer to this dilemma, and what they found possible to recommend was not, unnaturally, more in the field of the United States' relations with its allies and with the uncommitted nations (the distinction between neutrality and neutralism was particularly well-worth drawing) than in that of direct relations with the Communist countries. In the long run, since mankind cannot put its own discoveries behind it even when they are lethal ones, the only sure hope is in a change in the very nature of the Soviet regime, and in those regimes associated with it. And the book discards as relatively unproductive both the typical illusion of the "left"—that we can actively encourage such change by welcoming any apparent signs of it with open arms—or the "right's" illusion that we can foster it by economic or propagandist pressures. We do not know enough about such regimes, so Mr. Roberts believes, to calculate the consequences of actions designed to "influence" them, or to bring about their fall without general war.

Two particular points are certain to provoke much discussion. In Europe it will be the candid admission that the belief that Germany's commitment to NATO is likely to

facilitate German reunification—the basis of Dr. Adenauer's policy—cannot be maintained, and that it is not a Western interest that Germany should be reunited at the price of breaking her links with the West. In Asia it will be the decision that the Formosan government should be maintained indefinitely as the alternative government of China. Non-Americans may also feel that the book dismisses too easily, because of confidence in America's "start," the admitted evidence of the Soviet world's greater rate of economic growth, and does not sufficiently investigate the full implications of this fact.

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SIMMONS, ERNEST J. (Ed.). *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955. 563 pp. \$7.50.

The book under review is a symposium to which thirty scholars made original contributions with the aim of finding an answer to the important problem: "How clean a break has Soviet Russia made with its past, and how much is it still a land the Tsars would recognize?"

There are quite a few writers today who characterize the worst phenomena of the Soviet rule as a legacy of the past. The cruelty and arbitrariness of the Soviet regime are very often identified with allegedly similar phenomena of the Russian autocracy; Soviet collective farms are compared to the village communes and the *mir*; the Communist ideology is sometimes explained as being derived from the ancient idea of *sobornost* which the

Slavophiles regarded as one of the historical traits of Russian national psychology; and, finally, Soviet aggression is characterized as the continuation of Russian imperialism. Are such rapprochements sufficiently well-grounded? This problem embraces a number of other primarily independent problems, as, for example, those of economic development, the correlation between autocratic and democratic trends, spiritual values, ideological movements, international relations, and, finally, national goals (Messianism).

In conformity with the variety of particular problems connected with the main subject discussed in the book, it is divided into six parts: Realism and Utopia in Russian Economic Thought; Authoritarianism and Democracy; Collectivism and Individualism; Rationality and Nonrationality; Literature, State, and Society; and Russia and the Community of Nations (Messianic views and theory of action). Each part contains from four to five articles and at the end of each section there is a summary of the arguments by a leading scholar in the field.

The size and organization of the book may be considered as evidence of how complicated is the problem of continuity and change, of the constant and the variable in Russian pre- and post-revolutionary thought. The Editor of the volume does not deny some continuity but he emphasizes in his Introduction that "it would be a mistake to underestimate the tremendous transforming power of the forces let loose by the October Revolution." "Though Soviet totalitarianism," writes Professor Simmons, "is often regarded as a continuation of Tsarist autoc-

racy, the differences are more fundamental than the similarities." The reader will find similar points of view throughout the book: "... resemblances do not always imply continuities, and the profound changes may be initiated under the cover of systems of rule which appear superficially similar" (Professor Merle Fainsod, p. 173); "the Tsarist regime was authoritarian but it was not totalitarian" (p. 179); "the continuity is not between pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russian thought in general, but between one specific trend of pre-revolutionary thought and the ideas of Soviet leaders who had been brought up in that tradition." (Professor M. M. Karpovich, p. 279); Professors F. Barghoorn and Philip Moseley set forth some penetrating ideas concerning pre-revolutionary and Soviet expansionism, especially as regards the differences between them (pp. 532 ff. and 553-54).

The book under review did not solve the problem of whether there was more continuity than change in the post-revolutionary development of Russian thought. As Professor G. Robinson has pointed out in his very informative summary, "... no one would be bold enough to claim that here and now an accurate balance can be struck between continuity and change" (p. 377). Even such a broad statement is not without value. Among the non-Russian contributors the emphasis appears to be on the similarities, while the Russian émigrés emphasize the differences.

In any case, foundation of an objective and scientific analysis has been laid, and investigation has to be continued on the basis of an historical approach. It is, certainly, impossible to disassociate the Soviet

period from the Russian history which preceded it, because the Communist government has appropriated all the treasures of Russia's culture. Text-books of Soviet history begin with the Kievan period, and Soviet literature starts with the first chronicles and epics. The Russian nation continues to exist on the same territory, although materially extended after World War II, but with the same multi-national composition and ethnological peculiarities. Many of its problems are of historic origin.

But Russia has survived the social revolution. The former upper class has been completely destroyed, being replaced with new people singled out from the Communist ranks. The former intelligentsia shared, to some extent, the fate of the upper class; in part it emigrated, and in part it adjusted to the new conditions, co-operating with the new rulers until it was forced out, in many cases, by the new specialists. For a long time the best minds of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. were scholars of the pre-revolutionary period. By now almost all of them are gone. There are only a few writers, composers, and scholars of the pre-revolutionary time who are still alive. Together with the post-revolutionary generation of Soviet intelligentsia the new ideology and cultural values take on deep roots. The impact of the new conditions of life, of the new economic and social structure, and the cultural development of masses of the working people and national minorities become more and more influential and significant. Thus, the impact of the past on the individual psychology of the people is gradually lessening.

In the symposium under review

not everything significant has been duly considered by the contributors. It is difficult to understand, for example, how Professor A. Gerschenkron could omit, in his excellent paper on the problems of economic development, such well known works as Mendeleev's *K poznaniu Rossii* and Professor V. I. Grinevetsky's *Poslevoennye perspektivy Russkoi industrii*. In his summary of Part I, Gerschenkron has mentioned *passim* (p. 107) the success of industrialization in Russia at the beginning of this century, but he did not discuss either the economic plans of Count Witte and the Director of the Department of Industry, V. P. Litvinov Falinsky, or the program of economic development of Siberia and Turkestan expounded by Stolypin and Krivoshein.

The second part, in which the problem of "Autocracy and Democracy" is discussed, lacks an essential essay on Russian traditional *ajurism*, i.e. indifference toward law and legal order. The special significance of this peculiar phenomenon of Russian civilization has been elucidated by several Russian scholars, including the present writer, in the first chapter of his work, *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*.

In Part V, it seems strange not to find any reference to Tolstoy's interpretation of art. Neither are there any parallels between the development of literature, art, and music in Russia and in the Western world. Such parallels could help in understanding what is purely Russian phenomenon and what characterizes the modern development in general.

The book under review is a very valuable contribution to the literature on Russia and the Soviet Union. Besides material of purely scholarly

interest of an historical, economic, and cultural character, it contains some essays, such as McKenzie's paper on "The Third International" and Barghoorn's on "Postwar Soviet Ideology," which may be useful to policy makers in connection with current events.

GEORGE C. GUINS

Washington, D. C.

BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW K. *The Permanent Purge. Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956. 256 pp. \$4.75.

This is an analysis and a history of the purges conceived as a necessary and permanent part of any totalitarian regime. Although the author makes a few references to the Nazi regime, he actually limits his study to the Soviet purges probably because the Communist system is the only truly totalitarian regime existing at the present time. However, less excusable is the omission of any reference to the Eastern European purges which could hardly be dissociated from the Soviet system.

The first two chapters, in which the author develops his theory of purges, could have been greatly condensed, if the redundant repetitions were weeded out. The author is right when he stresses the importance of fear, inspired not only by actual purges but also by the permanent apprehension of being involved in the future purges, as one of the totalitarian weapons of government. He simplifies the matter when he fails to notice the existence of the other weapons, at least as important, especially the monopoly of information and propaganda. This monopoly, combined with fear,

produces the most terrifying effect, namely the passive and often active acceptance of the regime and of its goals and methods. Cz. Milosz gave an illuminating interpretation of this other aspect of totalitarianism in *The Captive Mind*. Mr. Brzezinski probably was so fascinated by his specific subject that he was unable to draw a more balanced picture. The totalitarian regime, explained only in terms of terror and purges, appears weaker than it really is. For instance, the author thinks that the totalitarian leadership isolated by terror lacks adequate information and operates on the basis of an "official" reality. This does not seem corroborated either by the survival of the Soviet regime for more than thirty-eight years or by the very skilful post-Stalinist foreign policy, both facts testifying to a good supply of information without which any government would be a failure.

The historical part, which represents the bulk of the book, is a well-written and useful summary of all the successive purges, including the one which followed Beria's fall. The author mentions, among Stalin's other victims, S. Kosior, whose post of Party boss in the Ukraine was taken over in 1938 by Khrushchev. It is one of the riddles of the last Party Congress that Kosior was among the very few purged old Bolsheviks who was rehabilitated by name. Did Khrushchev intend to convey the impression that he was innocent of the blood of his predecessor, or was it a maneuver planned by his colleagues to establish a blot on his Party career for further reference if need be?

The author rightly observes that the post-war, Stalinist and post-

Stalinist, purges were milder in their consequences for the victims (demotions, transfers, dismissals, and only on a relatively small scale, actual physical exterminations) and limited in scope to the higher echelons of the Party and State hierarchy. He offers a plausible explanation, namely that the new type of purges is due to the firm hold of the regime on the population and the rank-and-file Party members. Both the average citizen and the ordinary Party member have lost the desire to participate sincerely in politics after the harsh lesson they learned during the pre-war mass purges. Soviet politics are limited to the highest Party leaders and involve, willy-nilly, only their respective followers in the superior ranks of the Party and State bureaucracy.

Only a wishful thinker could disagree with the author's conclusion that the totalitarian regime cannot change its nature and abandon its tools of power, including terror, without risking its own downfall. To expect it, says the author, is to credit the regime "with greater stupidity than its own security could allow."

W. W. KULSKI

Syracuse University

HAIMSON, LEOPOLD H. *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955. 246 pp. \$5.50.

Although the title of this work indicates that its subject is Bolshevism, in reality it is rather more an account of the beginnings of Menshevism, the moderate socialist movement that opposed Lenin and his Bolsheviks in the early years of

the twentieth century and went down to defeat in the October Revolution of 1917. Lenin, as well as the Mensheviks, Martov and Plekhanov, figure in these pages, but the real hero is Paul Akselrod.

The best part of this volume is the background of the rise of the Social Democratic party in Russia. The author presents exceedingly readable sketches of the childhood and youth of Akselrod, Martov, and Lenin, citing psychological factors that may have been the cause of their becoming radical opponents of the regime of the Tsar. Equally valuable is the account of Plekhanov's shift from Populism to Marxism and of the difficulties encountered by Marxism in becoming a revolutionary, proletarian movement. At first an exotic theory, fighting for survival against dominant Populism, Marxism, after the momentous famine of 1891, won the allegiance of the young intellectuals, who understood the plight of the peasantry and the futility of the Populists. Marxism, "the wave of the future," became the guide of radicals and liberals, some of whom proceeded to modify it by extracting its revolutionary essence. When the factory workers began to display ever greater determination in the strike movement of the 1890's, the intellectuals, vastly encouraged, sought to expound to the proletarians the Gospel according to Marx. They quickly found, however, that the workers cared nothing for ideology and were interested only in bettering their own lot. It proved very difficult for the intellectuals to bridge the gap between themselves and the workers in order to convert the latter from "spontaneous" battlers for higher wages into "class-conscious" proletarians with a revo-

lutionary goal. This was the task which the young Lenin set for the Marxists. But whereas Akselrod and Martov believed that workers must join the bourgeoisie in overthrowing the autocracy, Lenin regarded the bourgeoisie as unreliable in battle and held that the proletariat, with the aid of the poorer peasantry, should push the reluctant bourgeoisie into the revolution. Moreover, the victorious proletarians should ensure that they as well as the bourgeoisie would derive benefits from the overturn.

The second part of the book is devoted to the split in the Social Democratic ranks that occurred at the London Congress in 1903. Here Lenin outgeneralled the moderates led by Akselrod and Martov and won a temporary victory. The author regards Lenin as a heretic because he, unwilling to rely on the laws of determinism to bring the workers inevitably and surely to a revolutionary course, felt that the party must be a small revolutionary elite which would dominate the masses and guide them along the true path, from which they might otherwise stray. Akselrod, who trusted the workers and was convinced that their spontaneous desires would, without fail, lead them to revolutionary class-consciousness, in the author's eyes is more true to Marxism. If only the war had not come—he seems to be saying—to interrupt the orderly course of Russia's development! Then the growth of the revolutionary spirit of the working class, along with the increasing conservatism of the peasants, influenced by Stolypin's land laws, would have realized Axelrod's vision of a more normal and orderly revolutionary development, and the monstrous mistakes flowing

from a perverted revolutionary policy would have been avoided.

While this is an interesting and valuable book, this reviewer cannot wholeheartedly approve the efforts to find in the early lives of the protagonists psychological explanations for the pronounced ideological characteristics that marked their later lives. It is an interesting exercise, but is it history? It is also to be wished that the exploration of all the twists and nuances of the ideological struggle could have been done in a more readable and less devious fashion. Nevertheless, it must be stated that this is a useful study, as it sheds light on the formative years of Russian Marxism, about which little has been written.

JOHN SHELTON CURTISS

Duke University

STOCKWELL, RICHARD E. *Soviet Air Power*. New York, Pageant Press, Inc., 1956. 283 pp. \$7.50; plus separate paperbound supplement.

There are four possible approaches to a study of the air power of the Soviet Union or of any other state: (1) the development of aircraft and air weapons; (2) the organizational relationships of the air forces (internally and to the military establishment as a whole); (3) the history of the air force; and (4) the doctrine and missions of the air arm and each component of it. Each of these approaches complements the others; each has a unique contribution to make to the understanding of the air power of a state. Richard Stockwell has stressed the first of these approaches. He devotes one chapter to organization, but he has virtually excluded the historical and doctrinal aspects and approaches, which

get but brief review in the first chapter. It is, however, legitimate to emphasize the first approach, as he has done. The only previous book in English entirely dedicated to discussing the Soviet Air Forces, that by Asher Lee in 1950, stressed the historical approach.

The contribution of the present book is that it represents the most substantial compilation of information on Soviet military aviation developments available to the public. Unfortunately, but understandably, the book is spotted with many errors. But the general picture and the basic trends of Soviet aviation development are there, and are well brought out and presented in a readable form. The author justly asks that "the result be judged in terms of the problem" of acquiring information, and he frankly states that "for the most part, this book is a reporting effort." It is a good reporting effort considering the dearth of reliable sources of information, but the reader may also find it advisable to adopt another standard of evaluation: Detailed information presented as factual can be accepted only with reserve and caution.

The heart of the book is contained in three chapters (four, five, and six) on Soviet aircraft, airplane powerplants, and missiles, and in a separate accompanying supplement to the book presenting in handy chart form the main performance and other characteristics of Soviet aircraft. There is also a very good description (in Chapter Two) of the postwar Soviet impressment and exploitation of German scientists and engineers. Stockwell, whose background particularly prepares him to deal with these subjects, does so to the full extent that material available to him permits.

Soviet civil aviation, and the training of youth in this field, are examined in two interesting and informative chapters (nine and ten). The author points to the real challenge of Soviet air-mindedness in the youth, and the high prestige and material rewards to the Soviet citizen who enters this field.

Soviet aviation, as this book indicates, is a field on which reliable information is scarce. It does not, therefore, reflect on the author's industry and competence that there are numerous errors in references to names, ranks, and Soviet designations of various aircraft. The student of Soviet affairs will readily observe other errors in the brief historical review of the Soviet air force, taken from secondary sources. For example, Trotsky was ousted as People's Commissar for War not in 1927 (pp. 11-12), but in 1924. Malenkov was not "put in charge" of the aviation industry in 1946 (p. 42)—he had been in charge throughout the war, and his influence declined during the postwar period. The Long Range Air Force (ADD) did not fly 7,000 flights "to Yugoslavia and other countries" during the war (p. 74); ADD flew 7,000 sorties in support of partisan operations, including *a few* to Tito and to aid the Slovak uprising. The discussions of present Soviet military organization and command, while basically sound, includes a number of incorrect statements. For example, there are no organizations such as "LOPI," an alleged fighter-bomber command (p. 69); "NOFLOT" (p. 79); "MDEP," an alleged arctic ADD command (p. 84); nor nationwide inner and outer zones of air defense (pp. 80-81). The recent police organization headed by Serov is not the MGB (p. 67),

which was abolished in 1953, but the KGB created in 1954. Stalin's son Vasily may indeed be in Siberia, but not as "an important commander" there (p. 72), nor was he ever chief of the fighter interceptor forces (p. 80). The fighter interceptors are not presently under any "General A. L. Torechich" (p. 80), and the Long Range Air Force has not been under Chief Marshal of Aviation (not "Marshal") Golovanov (p. 73) since the latter's relief in 1948. The Long Range Air Force is now called DA (*Dal'naiia Aviatsiia*), and no longer ADD (p. 73); etc., etc.

This book cannot be accepted as a scholarly study. Nonetheless, the paucity of publicly available information makes the book the best on its subject available to the general reader.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

The Rand Corporation
Washington, D. C.

LUNT, HORACE G. (Ed.). *Harvard Slavic Studies*, Vol. II. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954. 390 pp. \$6.00.

This volume is dedicated to Father Francis Dvornik, the eminent student of medieval Slavdom and Byzantium. It opens with a survey by Dimitri Obolensky of Father Dvornik's contributions to our knowledge of Eastern Europe during the ninth century and of the relations between Rome and Byzantium during that period and concludes with a 125-item bibliography of Dvornik's works. Appropriately, articles on early Slavic history and culture fill many of the pages in between.

Roman Jakobson, for example,

searches through the Russian Primary Chronicle, the early Czech-Latin legends and the *prolog* lives of Saints Cyril and Methodius for information on the early history of the Slavic Church. He brings to light a number of interesting facts and hints on this still rather obscure topic and points out several paths for future research.

Of an entirely different nature is Nikolai Trubetskoy's "Introduction to the History of Old Russian Literature," which was the opening lecture in a course at the University of Vienna. In contrast to Jakobson's minute textual analysis, Trubetskoy's lecture is a brilliant general treatment of the culture of Kievan Russia and of Russian Orthodoxy. This and Dmitry Cizevsky's article on genres in Old Russian literature should do much to remove traditional misconceptions about early Russian literature. Both should be required reading for persons approaching the study of this neglected period.

Two significant articles deal with the Muscovite and Petrine periods of Russian history. Ihor Sevcenko's "A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology" traces a number of Kievan and Muscovite quotations and adaptations from the "Horary Chapters" written by the Byzantine deacon Agapetus in the sixth century. Some of these quotations have previously been ascribed to Philo. Jury Serech's description of Feofan Prokopovich during his Kiev period also corrects some traditional misconceptions. Mr. Serech argues that Prokopovich was not a strong supporter of Peter's domestic reforms until he moved to Petersburg. He shows that the tragicomedy *Vladymyr*, for example, was not an

allegory on current political issues; Prokopovich apparently intended neither an analogy between Vladimir and Peter nor a satire on the Russian Orthodox clergy, as is often asserted.

The most important article dealing with modern Russian literature is Hugh McLean's "On the Style of the Leskovian *Skaz*," a perceptive analysis of the principal characteristics of Leskov's *Night Owls*. Many of his comments on this special form of colloquial narrative will be of use to those studying similar forms not only in Russian but also in foreign literatures.

In addition to the articles mentioned, the volume contains a number of studies in the history and culture of the other Slavic peoples and other more specialized articles on Russian literature. In general, the volume represents a high level of scholarship, is well edited and attractively printed.

J. F. MATLOCK, JR.

Dartmouth College

HAMILTON, GEORGE HEARD. *The Art and Architecture of Russia. The Pelican History of Art.* Baltimore, Md. Penguin, 1955. 320 pp. 180 pls. \$8.50.

The Pelican History of Art is planned by its editor, Dr. Nikolaus Pevsner of the University of London and former Slade Professor of Fine Art at Cambridge, to comprise fifty volumes on the major periods and cultures of art history. It is to the credit of the editor that the sixth volume in the series is on the rather special subject of Russian art and architecture from the Christianization in 988 to the fall of the Empire in 1917, a subject which has been

neglected by non-Slavic scholars. Professor George Hamilton of Yale University, an art historian by profession, who is able to read Russian, was selected as the author of the volume. By necessity he has had to limit his discussion to art and architecture west of the Urals, and due to his training he has considered Russian art in terms of Europe, believing, as did Catherine the Great, that Russia is a European state. Hence the author's approach is in keeping with the other volumes in the series and, in contrast to some works by Russian scholars which stress the native Russian characteristics without due reference to European influence.

For these reasons the book will be valuable to art historians and to students of Russian culture, especially to those who are unable to read Igor Grabar's monumental *History of Russian Art* which, incidentally, is in the process of being revised and enlarged by the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. The first two volumes of the new edition have already appeared but, unfortunately, were not available to Professor Hamilton.

The book is divided into five parts: Kievan Russia; Icon Painting; The Art of Muscovy; St. Petersburg; and Modern Russian Art. Each part is divided into chapters dealing with the various arts of the period or particular region under discussion. Ample footnotes, unfortunately located at the back of the complete text, provide additional information and specialized references not included in the excellent bibliography. In the part entitled

"Modern Russian Art," that is, from 1800 to 1917, one wishes that space could have been allowed for a discussion of the arts since the Revolution.

The author's sensitivity to works of art and his feeling for style are all too rare in American scholarship today. His discussion of icon painting is a masterpiece of this art form and communicates its importance and artistic quality to the reader, whether specialist or layman. In such an extensive survey as this certain parts are naturally derivative. This seems somewhat true of the discussion of Russian wooden architecture. A more extensive knowledge of Byzantine art would have strengthened the section on wall painting. However in such a vast book as this one has little justification for such complaints.

The chief fault of the book, and one which is freely admitted by the author is his lack of first-hand knowledge of the monuments. Due to circumstances this was not possible, but the presence of excellent plates helps to make up for this. Considering the difficulty in obtaining photographs from Russia and using plates from publications, the illustrations are remarkable.

George Hamilton's work is a valuable addition to the growing Pelican series which are rapidly becoming basic works in their special fields of art history. It is to be hoped that its high standard and excellent treatment of the subject will provide a stimulus to study and teaching of the history of Russian art.

THOMAS J. McCORMICK, JR.
Smith College

BOOK NOTICES

ANALECTA SLAVICA: *A Slavonic Miscellany Presented for His Seventieth Birthday to Bruno Becker*. Amsterdam: De Bezige bij Amsterdam, 1955. 223 pp.

Although the contributions to this *Festschrift* cover a variety of fields, including literature, linguistics, religion, history, and economics, almost all of them are on Russian topics. The largest number are concerned with literature. Ettore Lo Gatto presents a provocative interpretation of *Eugene Onegin* which demonstrates that the poem was more influenced by Pushkin's own experiences than has been hitherto assumed. J. van der Eng makes an interesting comparison between the views of Ivan Karamazov and those of Albert Camus. Other articles take up Chekhov's attitude toward the peasantry, Lavrov as a literary critic, the picture of the intelligentsia in some early Soviet novels, and the development of the heroes in Konstantin Fedin's novels. Outside literature, some of the most interesting articles include K. van het Reve, tracing the changes in the Soviet interpretation of the Moscow fire of 1812 (an excellent example of historiography dominated by ideology) and J. W. Bezemer's account of Soviet agricultural policy in 1953-54. It is probable that any student of Russia will find at least a few articles in this collection interesting and useful to him.

FESENKO, ANDREI and FESENKO, TATIANA. *Russky Yazyk pri Sovetakh* (The Russian Language Under the Soviets, in Russian). New York, published by the authors, 1955. 222 pp. \$3.00. ...
Though Russians often refer to

"the new Soviet language," there have been surprisingly few studies of changes in the Russian language since 1917. The Fesenkos present an interesting survey of some of the most striking innovations. They treat such topics as the use of abbreviated words, the penetration of slang and jargon into the literary language, current methods of forming neologisms and the revival of archaisms and Church Slavonicisms with the increased stress on Russian nationalism during and after World War II. Though modern linguistic methodology is largely absent from the book and the authors sometimes attribute normal linguistic changes to conditions in the Soviet system, the volume is nevertheless filled with important information and in addition makes interesting reading. The extensive bibliography will be most helpful to further studies on this subject.

The Great Pretense: A Symposium on Anti-Stalinism and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. May 19, 1956. 173 pp.

Organized by the Committee on Un-American Activities, this symposium endeavors to provide an adequate explanation for the anti-Stalin campaign proclaimed by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress. The thirty-eight contributors include former officials of the Soviet government, American ex-Communists, and well-known specialists on various aspects of the Soviet Union. (W. H. Chamberlin, D. Dallin, N. Timasheff, S. Possony,

F. Borkenan, etc.) There is a Foreword by the Chairman of the Committee, Francis E. Walter, and a Summation by J. Edgar Hoover. While the contributors vary in approach and emphasis, they all agree that the Kremlin's new course does not represent a fundamental change in the Soviet regime or its ultimate goal, but rather a new tactical maneuver more dangerous for the West than any thus far proclaimed. In the U. S. Communist Party, as in other native Communist parties, some confusion has developed as a result of Khrushchev's anti-Stalin campaign, but, as J. Edgar Hoover has put it: "There is no danger that the umbilical cord [with Moscow] will be severed."

KIRCHNER, WALTHER. *Eine Reise durch Sibirien im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*. Munich, Germany, Isar Verlag, 1955. 126 pp.

The first part of this work consists of brief accounts of various travellers and explorers in Siberia from 1725 to 1825; the second deals with the Siberian journey of a Swiss doctor, Jakob Fries, in 1774-1775. The material of the second part is based on a manuscript in the public library of Zurich, Switzerland.

KULSKI, W. W. *The Soviet Regime*. Rev. ed. Syracuse University Press, 1956. 815 pp. Trade ed. \$10.00; Text ed. \$8.00.

The revised edition includes a new chapter which analyses the Soviet policies enunciated by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. It also evaluates the meaning of the down-grading of Stalin, rehabilitation of his victims, and

the new "reforms" of the collective leadership.

LAZITCH, BRANKO. *Les Partis Communistes d'Europe, 1919-1955*. Paris, Les Iles d'Or, 1956. 254 pp.

This volume presents a condensed account of the European Communist Parties from 1920 to 1955. It analyses the leadership, strategy, organization, and results in national elections. Besides the histories of individual Communist parties in Western and Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, the book includes short chapters on the major changes in the party line, party Congresses, and Comintern resolutions.

NAGORSKI, ZYGMUNT, JR. (Ed.). *Legal Problems under Soviet Domination*, Volume I. Studies of the Association of Polish Lawyers in Exile in the United States (60 East 42nd Street, New York), 1956. 132 pp.

The purpose of this publication is "to present to the American reader a picture of Law and Justice as interpreted and applied by those who have conquered and subjugated countries and nations, nations formerly independent, now captive and behind an Iron Curtain." The volume contains six articles, including a lucid exposition of Soviet legality; "Soviet conception of Law and Protection of Human Rights," by Professor Marek St. Korowicz; book reviews, and notes and comments.

The National Economy of the U.S.S.R.: A Statistical Compilation. Issued by the Central Statis-

tical Administration of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. State Statistical Publishing House, Moscow, 1956. 271 pp.

"This statistical compilation contains the most important data which reflect the development of the U.S. S.R. national economy by comparison with the years 1928, prewar 1940, and prerevolutionary 1913." A limited number of copies of a translation of this work has been distributed to scholars by the State Department.

Report of the International Congress of Jurists at Athens, Greece, June 13-20, 1955, International Commission of Jurists, The Hague, 1956. 164 pp.

This is a summary of proceedings and results of the Congress in which legal experts from forty-eight countries discussed the major theme of the Congress: "To consider what minimum safeguards are necessary to ensure the just Rule of Law and the protection of individuals against arbitrary action by the state." The Congress accepted a solemn declaration of universal principles on the Rule of Law and requested the International Commission of Jurists (47, Buitenhof, The Hague, Netherlands) to endeavor "to secure their recognition by international codification and international agreement."

TOKAEV, G. A. *Soviet Imperialism*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1956. 77 pp. \$2.75.

This short account of Soviet mili-

tary strategy and tactics covers such topics as general strategy, military and political; the background of the Soviet army, navy, and air forces; the aims of Soviet military training; the morale of troops; strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet forces in action. The author is a former Colonel in the Soviet army, an engineer and aerodynamics expert by training. While serving in Berlin in this capacity, he decided to cross over to the West.

The U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Oxford Regional Economic Atlas. London, Oxford University Press, 1956. 134 pp. \$10.00.

This Atlas is arranged in three main parts: 1. General reference maps; 2. Topic maps (geology, soils, climate, agriculture, minerals, industries, transport, population, ethnology, etc.); 3. Gazetteer—references in terms of latitude and longitude for some 5,500 place names.

VIERECK, PETER. *Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill*. New York, Van Nostrand, 1956. 192 pp. \$1.25.

This stimulating, brief survey of conservatism contains a short section on the political philosophy of Pobedonostsev and Dostoevsky, including two excerpts from their works.

WILSON, EDMUND. *Red, Black, Blond and Olive: Studies in Four Civilizations*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956. 500 pp. \$6.75.

The bulk of this book (pp. 149-

384) is the author's Russian diary considerably revised since it was first published in 1936 (*Travels in Two Democracies*). These essays abound in interesting observations on Russian national character and literary and cultural life in 1935.

"The tone and the point of view," Mr. Wilson states, "are a part of the original experience which I could not reinterpret now." More recently written parts and those omitted in the original text are indicated by brackets.

THE INDEX

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